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For the first time, the United States Supreme Court, in Osborne
v. Ohio,, upheld a state statute prohibiting the in-home possession of
child pornography for personal use. 2 At the same time, the Court
delineated a new and broader definition of child pornography.2 In these
two respects, the Osborne ruling made significant inroads on the First
and Fourth Amendment rights to speech and privacy. 4 The Fourth
Amendment was affected because authorities can now inquire into the
contents of an individual's personal library. 5 Previously, an individual
had the right to possess any communicative material in the home that
was for personal use. 6 The First Amendment was affected because
the Court expanded the definition of child pornography permitting the
states to regulate material that was formerly protected by the First
7
Amendment.
The Court limited the First and Fourth Amendment rights to
speech and privacy because of the state's overriding interest in
eliminating the use of children in pornographic films and photographs.8
In Osborne, the Court balanced the nature of the harm that a child
suffers against the effectiveness of a ban on private possession 9 as a
means of curbing pornographic film production.10 This article explores
whether a prohibition against private possession of child pornography
is warranted, and how child pornography should be defined.

1. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
2. Id. at 1697.
3. Id. at 1698.
4. See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that although states retain
broad power to regulate obscenity, the First and Fourth Amendments prohibit states from
criminalizing in-home possession of obscene materials).
5. Cf. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97 (allowing prohibition of in-home possession of child
pornography).
6. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 110-14.
8. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696. Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-62 (1982)
(finding that the state could advance its interest in preventing sexual exploitation of children
by prohibiting the advertisement and sale of child pornography).
9. In this article "private possession" is used as a shorthand expression for possession in
one's home without intent to distribute or display.
10. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97.
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I.

CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

In New York v. Ferber," the United States Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited the commercial
production and distribution of non-obscene material depicting children
engaging in sexual conduct.'3 The statute was enacted "to prevent the
abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes . . . ,,4 Prior decisions of the Court had permitted
regulation of obscenity, but under the test for obscenity, the material
had to be patently offensive, appeal to the prurient interest, and,
when taken as a whole lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.'s In Ferber, the Court said that with material depicting
children, these three criteria need not be met. 6 Rather, the Court
determined that the commercial production and distribution of material
depicting children involved in sexual conduct caused substantial harm
to those children. 17 Therefore, the commercial production and distribution of such material could be regulated in order to protect the children 18 even if the material did not constitute obscenity under the
Miller v. Californiatest. 19 The Court reasoned that stopping the commercial distribution of the pornographic material will eliminate the
2
economic incentive to produce the films and photographs. 0
The Court's rationale for permitting the regulation of child pornography was different from its rationale for permitting the regulation
of obscenity. Although the Court has been vague on the governmental
interest that justifies regulating obscenity,21 its test focused primarily
on the offensive nature of the material to the public. 22 The Court has

11. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
12. For the Supreme Court's test for "obscenity," see infra text accompanying note 15.
13. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (reviewing N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.15 (Consol. 1984)).
14.

Id. at 753.

15.
16.
17.
18.

413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756, 761.
Id. at 756-58.
Id. at 764.

19.

See supra text accompanying note 15.

20. Id. at 760.
21. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 635-40 (1982).
22. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court's obscenity test also presumes that obscene
materials lack social value. Redish, supra note 21, at 638-39. See also Comment, The Price We
Pay for Pornography, A Karamazov View, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1395, 1397 (1988-89)
(authored by Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier) (stating that obscenity's exclusion from First Amendment
protection is justified because society benefits from the censorship of obscenity). The Ferber
Court, however, found that the test for child pornography does not consider either the offensive
nature or the social value of child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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dismissed arguments that obscenity regulation is justified because of
harm to the persons depicted, harm to the consumer, or harm to
members of the public by consumers of obscene material.Unlike the cases in which obscenity was regulated, the Court in
Ferber specifically delineated its justification for regulating child pornography. The Ferber Court based its decision on the harm children
suffer as a result of their posing for pornographic films or photographs.- Specifically, the Court found two types of harm.': First, a
child who is posing and being photographed while engaging in sexual
conduct suffers physical and psychological harm from the actual process
itself.26 The Court cited studies that indicated that posing and photographing a child engaging in sexual conduct may affect a child's personal relationships and sense of personal worth later in life.
Second, the Court found that the commercial distribution of the
depictions was harmful to the children.- Dissemination in the "mass
distribution system for child pornography" created the possibility that
the depiction might be used in later years in a fashion detrimental to
the child. 2 The Court said that if the commercial distribution can be
stopped, there will be no economic incentive to produce the depictions.3 °
The Ferber Court was cognizant that it was creating a new category
of First Amendment material subject to regulation .3 Therefore, the
Court set limits as to what would constitute "child pornography."32
To be considered child pornography, material must "visually depict
sexual conduct by children below a specified age." Additionally, the
state must prove the accused had scienter as to the character and
content of the depiction. 14
The Court in Ferber accepted the New York statute's definition
of "sexual conduct" as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate
sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Model
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-67 (1969).
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758-60.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 758 n.9.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting Shouvlin, Preventing the Social Exploitation of Children: A
Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)).
Id. at 760.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 764.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 765.
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abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals.""- The Court was initially
' 6
concerned with the definition of "lewd exhibition of the genitals, 1
because the Court had previously ruled that depictions of nudity are
protected speech.37 In Miller, the Court distinguished "lewd exhibition
of the genitals" from nudity.s Therefore, the Ferber Court added a

39
cautionary note that its definition not be read too broadly.
Because the New York statute did not prohibit possession of por-

nographic materials, the FerberCourt did not address the constitution-

ality of a ban on possession. 40 In the wake of Ferber,however, eighteen
states adopted legislation prohibiting the possession of Ferber-defined
child pornography regardless of whether there was an intent to distribute. 41 Moreover, with regard to the penalty, these statutes typically

did not distinguish between distribution and possession. 42 Rather, they
made possession as serious an offense as production and distribution.4 3
In addition to the eighteen states which have recently enacted

child pornography legislation, the federal government also stepped

35. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (Consol. 1984)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 765 n.18 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975)).
38. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 25 (giving examples of depictions a state could constitutionally
regulate as obscenity).
39. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
40. Kent & Truesdell, Spare the Child: The Constitutionality of CriminalizingPossession
of Child Pornography, 68 OR. L. REV. 363, 367 (1989) (noting that the Ferber Court did not
address the question of the constitutionality of prohibiting possession of child pornography).
Potuto, Stanley + Ferber = The ConstitutionalCrime of At-Home Child PornographyPossession, 76 Ky. L.J. 15, 17-18 (1987-88) (asserting that Ferber left unclear whether states could
prohibit possession of pornographic materials).
41. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3553 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-403 (West
1990); FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-1507A
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-3516 (Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.037
(Vernon Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-813.01 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730
(Michie Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (Anderson Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (Supp.
1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-3
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 (West Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-8C-3,
61-8D-6 (1989).
42. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.68A.050 to .070 (making distribution, transportation into state, or possession of material depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct a "class
C felony").
43. But see ALA. CODE. § 13A-12-192 (making private possession of child pornography a
less serious felony than possession "with intent to disseminate"); FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (making
commercial possession a second degree felony while private possession is a third degree felony);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100(g) (making commercial possession a felony, but private possession
a misdemeanor).
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into the arena. Recently, Congress enacted a law that almost completely prohibited the possession of child pornography.- The Child
Protection Act of 1984 forbade the receipt, in interstate or foreign
commerce, of visual materials depicting minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.45 The federal government's executive branch supported a ban on private possession. In 1986, the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography recommended that state legislatures
make the knowing possession of child pornography a felony.46
II.

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The eighteen post-Ferberstate statutes which banned the possession of child pornography 47 did not explicitly exempt private possession. 4s Therefore, it is unclear whether these states intended to prohibit
the private possession of child pornography as well. Although they
may have assumed that; the private possession of child pornography
was protected by the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, the states
may have also intended that their statutes prohibit private posses9
sion.4
Regardless of what the state legislatures may have intended, local
prosecutors brought charges for private possession of Ferber-defined
child pornography under these statutes.- Trial courts convicted and
state appellate courts affirmed these convictions. 51 In 1986, the Ohio

44. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 206 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2255 (1988)).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988). The penalty for a first offense is a maximum ten years imprisonment, a $100,000 fine, or both. Id. § 2252(b). See generally United States v. Boffardi, 684
F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (denying a privacy challenge and upholding a prosecution under
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) for in-home receipt of child pornography shipped in interstate commerce),
af.fd mem., 872 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1989); Myers, 'Sting' Nets 15 Child-PornographyRecipients,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 28, col. 2 (describing indictments under Child Protection Act for
receipt of child pornography as result of U.S. Postal Service establishing a fake child pornography
mail order company that sent advertisements to persons suspected of trafficking in child pornography).
46. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY:
FINAL REPORT 648 (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY].
47. See supra note 41.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. For definition of "private possession," see
supra note 9.
49. Potuto, supra note 40, at 18 n.18.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
51. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/2
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Supreme Court upheld a conviction for private possession 52 after an
intermediate appellate court reversed the conviction as a violation of
the defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy.- Similarly, in
1988, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a conviction for private possession under an Illinois statute.5 Both the Ohio and Illinois Supreme
Courts found that the harm to the child used in the production and
distribution of child pornography outweighed an individual's privacy
interest in possessing such material in the home for personal use.5
The right to privacy has been recognized in a variety of situations. 6
The right unsuccessfully asserted by the defendants in the Ohio and
57
Illinois cases was the privacy right to receive information in the home.
As applicable to printed or visual matter possessed in the home, this
right derives from two separate guarantees found in the Bill of Rights.
First, the First Amendment protects the right to speech including
the concomitant right to receive information from others. Second,
without reliable information that evidence of a crime might be found,
the Fourth Amendment prohibits governmental intrusion into the
home 9

52. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986) (upholding OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2907.322(A)(5)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987). This is not the statute at issue
in Osborne v. Ohio.
53. State v. Meadows, No. C-850091, at 5 (Ohio Ct. App., 1st Dist. Dec. 18, 1985)
(WESTLAW, 1985 WL 4501), rev'd 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 936 (1987).
54. People v. Geever, 122 Il. 2d 313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (upholding ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 11-20.1 (1989)), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 920 (1988).
55. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1206-07; Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 52, 503
N.E.2d at 703; see also Savery v. State, 767 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (denying a
privacy challenge and upholding a prosecution for private possession of child pornography under
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26); State v. Davis, 53 Wash. App. 502, 504, 768 P.2d 499, 501
(Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (denying a privacy challenge and upholding a prosecution under WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 for private possession of child pornography).
56. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 & n.7 (1984) (reaffirming "reasonable" privacy
expectations in the contents of fire-damaged buildings); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (finding that the right of privacy can extend to decisions on whether
to publicize one's entertainment performance); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that
constitutional right to privacy extends to a woman's decision to have an abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a constitutional right to privacy in the marital relationship).
57. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d at 327, 522 N.E.2d at 1206-07; Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d at 52, 503
N.E.2d at 704.
58. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). The First Amendment prohibits abridgment of the "freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
59. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112-14 (1964), overruled in part by, Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that Aguilar "two-pronged test" abandoned in favor
of the broader "totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis for determining probable cause). The
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In Stanley v. Georgia,60 the United States Supreme Court said
that the government may not dictate what printed or visual materials
persons may possess in their home for their own personal use. 61 Stanley
involved Georgia's effort to prohibit the private possession of obscene
films.62 The Supreme Court, relying on the "fundamental" First and
Fourth Amendment rights, found this prohibition to be unconstitutional.- The Court reasoned that both the First and Fourth Amendments guarantee the freedom of speech and "the right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy. "6
The Stanley Court said that its decision still permitted criminalizing
the possession of certain printed or visual materials.- For example,
a federal statute may prohibit the possession of classified national
security materials that might be used against the United States.Prohibiting the possession of classified national security materials is
permissible because of the possible harm that the materials could
cause.6 7 In contrast, obscenity was possessed solely for personal uses,
so the Stanley Court held that its regulation would be unconstitutional.
Although the Stanley Court permitted the private possession of
obscene materials, the production and sale of those materials constitutionally may be prohibited. 69 This differed from the rule applicable to
the possession of materials such as weapons or narcotics where not
only production and sale, but also private possession, may be proscribed. 70 Therefore, the Stanley privacy right applied only to com-

Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
61. Id. at 565.
62. Id. at 559.
63. Id. at 564. The Court later disputed whether it had based Stanley entirely on the First
Amendment or on both the First and Fourth Amendments. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 195 (1986) (finding that Stanley was "firmly grounded in the First Amendment"); but see
id. at 207-08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that Stanley protected both a First and Fourth
Amendment right).
64. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
65. Id. at 568 n.11.
66. Id. (referring to 18 U.SC. § 793(d) (1988)).
67. Cf. id. at 566-68 (arguing that if obscenity causes behavior which harms others, then
states should regulate the behavior rather than regulate the consumption of ideas contained in
obscenity).
68. Id.
69. See id. at 563-64, 568.
70. See id. at 568 n.11.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/2
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municative materials possessed in the home for their personal communicative value. 71 This treatment of communicative materials
reflected the preferred status of First Amendment rights. 72
After Stanley, the Supreme Court declined to extend the possession
right to contexts other than the home. In various cases, the Court
held that this right did not cover the possession of obscene materials
in public,7 the receipt of obscene materials by mail, 74 the importation
of obscene materials from abroad,75 or the exhibition of an obscene
film in a commercial movie theater. 76 Although the Court never renounced Stanley, the Court's failure to extend the Stanley holding to
other situations led some commentators to question Stanley's continuing validity.
III.

THE PRIVATE POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

The clash between the state's right to regulate child pornography
recognized in Ferber, and the individual's right to privacy recognized
in Stanley came before the United States Supreme Court in 1989 in
a case from Ohio. In Osborne v. Ohio,7s Osborne was convicted for
the possession of four photographs of nude minors under an Ohio
statute.79 The statute, unlike the child pornography statute challenged
in the earlier Ohio case, s° used extremely broad language to define
sexually-oriented material involving minors.,' The other post-Ferber
statutes defined the prohibited material as anything involving sexual
conduct or lewd depictions.m2 In Osborne, the statute prohibited, with

71. See id. at 566-67, 568 n.ll.
72. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); see, e.g., Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844 (1970) (examining Supreme Court overbreadth doctrine and arguing for an approach which voids any statute which is construed to
infringe on First Amendment rights of the party challenging the statute or any hypothetical
parties).
73. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142-43 (1973).
74. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).
75. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8 nm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1973);
United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971).
76. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
77. Potuto, supra note 40, at 16-17.
78. 110 S.Ct. 1691 (1990).
79. Osborne, 110 S.Ct. at 1695.
80. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986) (reviewing OHiO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.322(A)(5) (Anderson Supp. 1990)), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 936 (1987).
81. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (prohibiting possession
of material "that shows a minor ... in a state of nudity").
82. For citation to post-Ferber statutes, see supra note 41.
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certain exceptions, the possession of depictions of nude minors.- The
statute was thus an unlikely one to raise the Stanley-Ferber conflict
because it was not based on child pornography as defined by the
Ferber Court.- Consequently, the Ohio statute in Osborne prohibiting
the possession of depictions of nude minors was problematic in light
of the Supreme Court's statements in Ferber and an earlier case8 that
depictions of nudity constitute protected speech.",
The statute came before the United States Supreme Court after
the Ohio Supreme Court narrowly construed the statutory language
to cover only "lewd" depictions or those that involved a "graphic focus
on the genitals.'17 The Ohio court thereby attempted to limit the ambit
of the statute to material which satisfied the Ferber definition of child
pornography.- Notwithstanding the Ohio Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the statute, Osborne's conviction presented the United
States Supreme Court with a case of first impression. The question
in Osborne was whether private possession of child pornography could
be prohibited consistent with the First and Fourth Amendments.9
In Osborne, the United States Supreme Court decided six votes
to three that the Ohio Supreme Court's formulation was adequate to
limit the Ohio statute's coverage to Ferber-definedchild pornography.The Supreme Court reasoned that the individual's privacy right was
subordinate to the state's interest in prohibiting the private possession

OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3).
84. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1706-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting substantial differences between statutes in Ferber and the instant case).
85. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
86. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 213.
87. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 252, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (1988), rev'd sub nowm.
Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
88. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (stating that child pornography is material which "visually
depict[s] sexual conduct by children below a specified age") (emphasis omitted).
89. The question was not presented quite as neatly as the text suggests. Because Ohio
Revised Code § 2907.323(A)(3) was overbroad as written, there was a serious issue as to whether
it could be used against Osborne. The six-member majority decided that it could. Osborne, 110
S. Ct. at 1697-1703. Thus, the Court could consider whether Osborne could be prosecuted for
private possession. For an argument that the Court should have decided in Osborne's favor on
this issue and should not have reached the issue of the constitutionality of a ban on private
possession of child pornography, see Quigley & Shank, The Invalidity of an Overbroad Statute,
40 U. KAN. L. REV. 45 (1991). In Osborne, the Court did find that because the limiting construction had been made only at the appellate level, and Osborne's conviction was affirmed on the
basis of that construction, Osborne had been denied due process and was entitled to a new trial.
See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1703-05. It, therefore, reversed the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
and remanded. Id.
90. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1698.
83.
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of child pornography. 91 The Court distinguished Stanley by stating
that child pornography was different from obscenity for purposes of
a privacy analysis.9 Writing for the majority in Osborne,Justice White
stressed that "Stanley should not be read too broadly." 93 Justice White
accepted Ohio's argument for overriding the right to privacy. According to Ohio, because the state has a compelling interest in protecting
its citizens, it may regulate child pornography more effectively by
prohibiting not only production and distribution, but also private possession of child pornography.9
In Stanley, the Court refused to allow a prohibition on the private
possession of obscenity on the alleged theory that the prohibition would
reduce the trade in obscene materials.9 5 The Court thus permitted
Georgia to proscribe the circulation of obscene matter without prohibiting its private possession.9 In Osborne, however, the Court concluded
that the state had a stronger interest in the regulation of child pornography than in the regulation of obscenity.Y The protection of children
depicted in pornography, according to the Osborne Court, justifies
this stronger interest overriding the possessor's privacy rightA' The
Court accepted Ohio's contention that a significant amount of distribution of child pornography occurs outside commercial channels. 99 Therefore, the Court concluded that a prohibition on distribution alone was
insufficient."°°
In addition, Ohio argued that a ban on the possession of child
pornography was necessary to protect children from two forms of
possible abuse. 101 First, child molesters who possess child pornography
may use the depictions to convince a child to engage in sexual conduct. "'1 The Supreme Court agreed that this was a legitimate harm
which entitled Ohio to prohibit private possession. 10 3 Second, the Court
reasoned that child pornography "permanently record[ed] the victim's

91.

Id. at 1695-97.

92.

Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1695.
Id. at 1696-97.
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
Id.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97.

98. Id.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1697.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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abuse," causing potential harm to the child in the future.' The Court
held that these possible harms gave Ohio a compelling reason to over05
ride the possessor's privacy right.'
IV.

A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE AS AN ELEMENT OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY

Ohio asserted that Ferber drove the child pornography market
underground, and thus states were no longer able to curtail child
pornography by raiding retail shops alone.106 Ohio claimed that the
economic incentive to produce or distribute child pornography would
be eliminated only if private possession was prohibited.10 7 Although
the Court accepted Ohio's factual assertions about child pornography
as a basis for overriding the privacy right, the Court did not examine
Ohio's factual claims in detail. '°s The Supreme Court in Osborne
analyzed the privacy issue in only four paragraphs. 109
In Ferber, the Supreme Court authorized the prohibition of commercial production and distribution of child pornography, in order to
eliminate the economic incentive to produce it.110 The eighteen postFerber statutes prohibited the possession of child pornography even
if it was not commercially produced or distributed.- The Supreme
Court in Osborne accepted Ohio's argument that "since the time of
our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has
been driven underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution."i- Consequently, the Court permitted Ohio's
broad prohibition against possession of child pornography regardless
of whether the material had been commercially produced or distributed.113 Moreover, the Court upheld the ban on possession even if the
4
possessor had no intent to distribute the prohibited material. 11
104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Brief for Appellee at 20, Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (No. 88-5986).
Id. at 19-21.
See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
Id. at 1696-97.
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765-66.

111. See statutes cited supra note 41. Also, the federal Child Protection Act of 1984 eliminated the requirement under federal law that sexual material depicting children be commercially
produced and distributed. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988), noted in Kent & Truesdell, supra note 40,
at 369; Weiss, The Child ProtectionAct of 1984: Child Pornographyand the First Amendment,
9 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 344-45 (1985).
112. Osborne, 110 S.Ct. at 1697.

113.

Id.

114.

See id. at 1696-97.
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Ohio's argument in Osborne against limiting the prohibition to commercially produced child pornography was based on a report by the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. 15 The Commission
determined that although depictions of children engaged in sexual
conduct are often "homemade," "a homemade item may eventually be
sold to a commercial child pornography publication. ' 111 Thus, Ohio
argued, a ban on the private possession of child pornography was the
only way to eliminate the underground market that existed after
7
Ferber."1
In stating that private distribution had replaced commercial distribution of child pornography, the Court in Osborne was only partially
correct. Commercial production and distribution of child pornography
existed in the United States in the 1970s, 11 but virtually ceased after
1980."1 However, this commercial network was not replaced by any

115. Brief for Appellee at 22-23, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
116. COIMIISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 650. It should be noted with
respect to this and other factual findings of the Commission that no independent research was
commissioned as a result of "budgetary and time constraints." Id. at 218. See generally Richards,
Pornography Commissions and the FirstAmendment: On ConstitutionalValues and Constitutional Facts, 39 ME. L. REV. 275 (1987) (comparing the Commission's report with prior reports
which had utilized independent research). Also, the Commission was composed primarily of
persons strongly inclined to expand governmental controls on obscenity and pornography. Lynn,
"Civil Rights" Ordinances and the Attorney General's Commission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 27, 28-29 (1986) ('The Commission is chaired
by Henry Hudson, . . . who was commended by President Reagan several years ago for his
zealous opposition to pornography. Among the other ten members of the Commission are...
people who also have records indicating a bias against sexually-oriented speech.").
117. See Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
118. See COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supranote 46, at 601. The scope of this industry
is difficult to ascertain. A committee established by the Illinois Legislature in 1977 found it to
be modest. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMIAI'N, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN: A REPORT TO THE ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY 30 (1980) [hereinafter SEXUAL EXPLOITATION] ("Pornography and other sex-related 'industries' continue to be enormous operations
in this country. However, neither child pornography nor child prostitution has ever represented
a significant portion of the industry.").
119. Stanley, The Child Porn Myth, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 295, 315 (1989); see
SENATE COMM. ON GOVT. AFFAIRS, PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PEDOPHILIA, S. REP. No. 537, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 29, 36, 42-43 (1986)
(finding there is little importation or commercial bookstore sales of child pornography, little
domestic videotape production, and few police discoveries of child pornography operations);
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 118, at 27, 30 (reporting that F.B.I., despite two years
of diligent efforts, had been unable to find child pornography through raids and placing orders
with suspected sellers); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLLUTING THE CENSORSHIP
DEBATE: A SUIMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 104 (1986) ("[T]here is virtually no commercial marketing of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 43

substantial private production distribution network.120 The Attorney
General's Commission failed to cite any evidence establishing the existence of such a network. 121 Likewise, in Osborne neither Ohio nor the
Supreme Court cited any evidence establishing the existence of a
private child pornography network.'- Thus, the Court relied on supposition in concluding that large quantities of child pornography were
being distributed privately.
In order to override Lhe First and Fourth Amendment rights, the
Court needed to find that Ohio had a compelling interest in protecting
children used in child pornography, that Ohio's methods of regulation
of child pornography served that compelling interest, and that the
regulation effectuated that interest in the least restrictive way. '3 In
Osborne, the Court easily determined, citing Ferber, that Ohio had a
compelling interest in protecting children from being posed in child
pornography.'- In Ferber, however, the Court determined that child
pornography was unprotected speech because of the harms specifically
flowing from commercial production and distribution of child pornography.'- In Osborne, to the contrary, the commercial element was
absent. The evidence presented established that Osborne received the
photographs from a friend who had taken them himself.126 Thus, an
additional rationale was needed for Ohio to satisfy the "compelling
interest" criterion and in turn regulate the private production and
distribution of child pornography and the private possession that would
follow.
Consequently, Ohio argued that a commercial purpose was not an
element of Ferber-defined child pornography. 127 "While it is true that

child pornography in the United States."); Criminal Justice Newsletter, Sept. 16, 1986, at 7
(stating that child pornography is no longer readily available in the United States since "[flew
commercial pornography dealers appear willing to risk handling child pornography").
"Prior to the late 1970s, when awareness end [sic] concern about child pornography escalated
dramatically, commercially produced and distributed child pornography was more prevalen' than
it is now." COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 408. "When the Supreme Court
in 1982 approved of child pornography laws . . . enforcement efforts accelerated, and the sum
total of these enforcement efforts has been to curtail substantially the domestic commercial
production of child pornography." Id. at 408-09.
120. Stanley, supra note 119, at 315-16.
121. See COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 601.
122. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697; Brief for Appellee at 20-21, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
123. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
124. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58).
125. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
126. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. Brief for Appellee at 33-34, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
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Ferberwas directed at commercial distribution of child pornography,
the [Clourt's opinion in Ferber clearly indicates that a commercial
purpose [was] not required .

... ,1" In Ferber, however, the sole

issue before the Court was whether New York might "prohibit the
dissemination of material which shows children engaged in sexual condvct," in order "[t]o prevent the abuse of children who are made to
engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes .... ,- The Ferber
opinion was thus directed at the evils of the child pornography industry
when the final product is used for "commercial purposes." The Court
in Ferbernever mentioned private production or distribution.30
To support a ban on the commercial production and distribution of
child pornography, the Supreme Court in Ferbercited legislative findings from the New York Legislature. 1" The Court determined that
the statute was aimed at "those who seek to profit through a commercial network based upon the exploitation of children." 1 2 The Court
also found that the mass distribution of child pornography achieved
by commercial production and distribution resulted in substantial harm
to the children depicted.' Thus, the criminalization of the commercial
production and distribution of child pornography was authorized to
"prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual
conduct for commercial purposes . .

.

As with commercial production, private production of child pornography presents the same possibility of substantial harm to the child
through the photographing process itself. Private production, however, does not involve the additional harm involved in the mass circulation of child pornography. In fact, the Court in Ferber found that
the additional harm from commercial distribution was a necessary
element justifying a state to regulate child pornography."5 The Ferber
Court determined that a commercially-produced depiction of a child
engaged in sexual conduct would eventually circulate widely and possibly be detrimental to the child in the future. 36 Supporting this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court cited a study that concluded: "A
child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 34.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
See id. at 774.
Id. at 757, 757 n.8 (citing 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 910, § 1).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 756, 759-60.
Id. at 759 n.10.
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within the mass distribution system for
the recording is circulating
137
pornography.'
child
A commercially produced and distributed photograph presents a
much more significant danger to the depicted child than a photograph
produced by an individual for personal use only. Moreover, Ohio's
concern that material produced privately will eventually move into
the commercial network was only realistic in the 1970s when such a
commercial network existed.- When that network vanished after
1980,139 Ohio's concern lost its validity.
Thus, while production of child pornography for non-commercial
purposes may harm the children involved, the harm is not nearly as
substantial as with child pornography intended for commercial production and distribution. The result is that a state's interest justifying
the regulation of child pornography is weak. That weaker interest in
turn gives the state a weaker basis to argue that private production
and possession should be prohibited. When a state prohibits private
possession, however, this weaker interest must be assessed against
the possessor's privacy interest.
If child pornography involved only the posed depiction of children
performing sex acts, the harm involved in the photographing would
provide a stronger basis for overriding the privacy interest of the
possessor. However, in Osborne, the Court approved a definition of
child pornography that, as will be shown below, did not require sex
acts,' 4 0 or that the person depicted be below the age of consent for
sexual conduct,"4 or even that the depiction be posed, 14 2 rather than
a candid photograph of activity being done for other reasons. In light
of this broad definition of child pornography, the rationale is not strong
for overriding the privacy interest of a possessor.
V.

THE USE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY FOR SEDUCTION

In Osborne, the State of Ohio pressed upon the Supreme Court
the argument that child molesters show child pornography to children

137.

People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 326, 522 N.E.2d 1200, 1206 (citing Shouvlin, Prevent-

ing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545
(1981)), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 920 (1988).
138. See COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 601; supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 271-316.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 321-28.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 342-47.
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in order to convince the children to engage in sexual activity.'14 The
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography stated that
there is substantial evidence that photographs of children
engaged in sexual activity are used as tools for further molestation of other children. Children are shown pictures of other
children engaged in sexual activity, with the aim of persuading . . . [the] young child that if it is in a picture, and if
other children are doing it, then it must be all right for this
child to do it. 144
The Commission did not, however, provide any details about the
"substantial evidence" on which this statement was based. 145 In fact,
the Commission acknowledged that a child molester might also use
pictures of adults engaged in sexual conduct to convince children to
engage in sexual conduct with them. 146 One analyst of child molesters'
behavior also suggested that child pornography may be used for seduction, but he too provided no foundation for his statement. 147 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Osborne accepted the factual assertion
that child molesters use child pornography to entice children to engage
in sexual activity as an aspect of Ohio's compelling interest to justify
a prohibition on the private possession of child pornography.'4 The
child pornography to seduce other
Court said that "pedophiles 1use
49
activity.'
sexual
children into
The assertion that child pornography is used as a "tool" in the
commission of a crime' 5° places the prohibition on the possession of
child pornography in the category of preventing "anticipatory criminal

143. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
144. COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 411, cited in Osborne, 110 S. Ct.
at 1697 n.7.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 411 n.74. But cf. Potuto, supra note 40, at 27 (rejecting the possibility that a
possessor of child pornography might thereby be encouraged to engage in sexual conduct with
children, "at least until a direct causative link is shown").
147. K. LANNING, CHILD MOLESTERS: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS FOR LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS INVESTIGATING CASES OF CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION 23-24 (1986); see
also K. Lanning, Collectors, in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEX RINGS 83, 86 (A.W. Burgess
ed. 1984) (asserting that child pornography lowers children's inhibitions).
148. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
149. Id. (citing COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supranote 46, at 649 ("Child pornography
is often used as part of a method of seducing child victims. A child who is reluctant to engage

in sexual activity with an adult or to pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced
by viewing other children having 'fun' participating in the activity.") (citations omitted)).
150. See Potuto, supra note 40, at 45.
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offenses." The premise of such offenses is that the activity, while not
harmful in itself, may lead to harm.151 An example is a statute prohibiting the possession of burglar tools.' 52 Statutes which prohibit anticipatory criminal offenses, however, typically require proof of an intent
to cause the harm.'1 Burglar tool statutes, for example, include as an
element of the offense that one harbors an intent to use the tool in a
criminal fashion. - Liability is not based on mere possession of the
regulated item. 155 With burglar tool statutes, of course, no speech and
privacy interests are at stake. With the private possession of child
pornography, however, the prohibition directly infringes on an individual's right to speech and privacy, and the prohibition is based on
mere possession. 5 Thus, although a state has a lawful right to prohibit
harmful activity, a state may not prohibit the possession of every
instrumentality that might be used for an illegal purpose, particularly
where the instrumentality is communicative material.
Rather than comparing the possession of child pornography to the
possession of burglar tools, a more appropriate analogy might be to
compare the private possession of child pornography to the private
possession of a book that explains how to crack a safe. A state would
be unable to prohibit the private possession of such a book because
its possession would be protected by the constitutional speech and
privacy rights. The book would receive protection even though the
possessor might use the book to crack safes, and even though such a
157
book has no other use than to facilitate safe-cracking.
It is possible that many adults who engage in sexual conduct with
children possess child pornography. That does not mean, however,
that a significant percentage of those adults use the pornographic
materials to entice children to engage in sexual conduct with them.
An investigative commission on pornography established by the Illinois

151.
152.

See id.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 310.06 (1989).
153. See id.
154. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE § 2923.24 (1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.06 (1962).
155. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 531 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1988) ("[T]he [burglar tool] statute
criminalizes the intent to use an item in an illegal way. Mere possession standing alone will not
constitute a crime.").
156. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
157. However, in one case a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction against
publishing an article that described how to manufacture a hydrogen bomb. United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (1979). But there the Court
was concerned about serious harm to national security and the significant physical harm which
might ensue from the publication: "A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave
the way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all." Id. at 996.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/2

18

Quigley: Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Legislature concluded "that pornography may be fine for perhaps
thousands of individuals. They will do nothing more with it or from
Until those states that prohibit possession of child
it than read it.'
pornography establish empirically that possessors of child pornography
molest children, no factual basis exists for the states' argument. Empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate the states' compelling interest in banning the possession of child pornography based on the
assertion that the pornography is used to entice children to engage
in sexual conduct with adults.
In the context of protecting the private possession of obscenity,
the Supreme Court reasoned in Stanley that consequential harm is
not a basis for undermining an individual's privacy right. 159 That
reasoning should apply equally to both child pornography and obscenity. The Osborne Court, however, used the alleged consequential harm
caused by child pornography as a basis to infringe upon the privacy
right. 1' In Stanley, the Court noted that the government must rely
upon education to prevent crime and may resort to punishment only
when there has been an actual violation. 161 Criminalizing the possession
of child pornography because an individual may use the depictions to
commit a crime, however, punishes the possessor before a violation
has been conunitted.
Speech and privacy rights -are unduly restricted when possession
of child pornography is prohibited on the ground that the possessor
may use the material to convince a child to engage in sexual conduct.
The grounds are too speculative to overcome the fundamental constitutional right to speech and privacy involved in the possession of communicative material. 162 Even if the states established that many child
molesters use child pornography to seduce children, the conduct of
child molesting is what should be punished, not the possession of child
pornography. Criminalizing the possession of child pornography
penalizes many who possess child pornography, but who would never
consider molesting a child. Ohio's implication that the possession of

158. SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, supra note 118, at 31.
159. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-68.
160. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97.
161. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67.
162. See Note, Private Possession of Child Pornography:The Tensions Between Stanley
v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 208-10 (1987) (authored
by Susan G. Caughlan) (arguing that because criminalization of private possession of child
pornography may be ineffective to deter child sex offenders who lure their victims with adult

pornography, criminalization of private possession is not directly related to preventing child
sexual abuse).
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child pornography leads to the actual abuse of children was speculative. 1 Moreover, a person might offer many things to a child such as
money or presents to urge compliance with sexual demands. No evidence exists to indicate that pornographic depictions are unique in
their ability to entice a child to engage in sexual activity.
VI.

SEXUAL ABUSE BY POSSESSORS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

In Osborne, Ohio pressed upon the Supreme Court another argument in support of a total prohibition on the private possession of
child pornography, namely, that many persons who sexually abuse
children possess child pornography. 1 Ohio suggested that a prohibition
on the private possession of child pornography provides an alternative
means to prosecute child molesters.165 Proscribing private possession
makes available a surrogate crime that can be used to prosecute the
possessor who is accused of sexually molesting a child when a prosecution for child molestation cannot proceed because of the difficulty associated with using the testimony of a small child.-6 Ohio also
suggested that a person suspected of molesting a child could be prosecuted for possession of child pornography, instead of child molestation, in order to spare the child victim from having to testify.167
Such testimony can be traumatic for the child.-' s The problem of
using child testimony, however, does not justify banning possession
of child pornography when the ban is not a crime justifiable on its
merits. In the Osborne opinion, the Supreme Court did not allude to
this argument, which suggests that the Court did not find it convincing.

163. Brief for Appellee at 22, Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1691 (No. 88-5986).
164. Brief for Amici Curiae Concerned Women for America, Focus on the Family, Family
Research Council, National Coalition Against Pornography, National Legal Foundation, Athletes
for Kids, National Christian Association, and the Berean League, at 28-29, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
165. Brief for Appellee at 21, Osborne (No. 88-5986). See also Potuto, supra note 40, at
57-61 (arguing that criminalizing possession would make conviction of child abusers easier, would
be less traumatic to child victims, and would result in more convictions).
166. Potuto, supra note 40, at 57-61.
167. Brief for Appellee at 24, Osborne (No. 88-5986). See also Kent & Truesdell, supra
note 40, at 367 (asserting that criminalizing "mere possession of child pornography would spare
child victims the horrors of ...
testifying," and would spare courts the difficulties attendant
with a child victim's testimony).
168. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3168-69 (1990) (finding that a "growing body of
academic literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child abuse victims" supports a state's judgment to protect child abuse victims from the emotional trauma of confronting
their alleged abusers in court); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022 (1988) (O'Connor, J.. concurring)
(recognizing that "[m]any States have determined that a child victim may suffer trauma from
").
exposure to the harsh atmosphere of the typical courtroom ....
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The Osborne Court was also silent on a related argument that was
asserted to justify a ban on the private possession of child pornography. 169 That argument suggested that the possession of child pornography may encourage the possessor to engage in sexual conduct with
children.' 7- This argument was similar to the argument made by Georgia in Stanley regarding obscenity.171 In Stanley, Georgia had argued
that one justification for prohibiting the private possession of obscenity
was that possessors may be encouraged to commit unlawful sexual
acts after viewing the obscene materials. 72 The Court found, however,
that the data presented did not warrant a finding of a cause and effect
relationship between possession of obscenity and committing sexual
crimes.H The Court reasoned that even if such a relationship existed,
"inthe context of private consumption of ideas and information we
should adhere to the view that '[a]mong free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment
''74
for violations of the law.
The Osborne Court did not mention the issue of cause and effect
between possession of child pornography and child molestation. Just
as there was little evidence indicating the impact obscene material
has on the possessor, little evidence exists indicating the impact child
pornography has on its possessor. 75

VII.

POSSESSION AS AN ADJUNCT TO DISTRIBUTION

To justify a ban on the private possession of child pornography,
Ohio also argued that possessors of child pornography are easier to
detect than producers and distributors of child pornography. 176 This
reasoning was accepted by the Osborne Court' even though the Stanley Court had rejected the same contention in the context of obscenity.178 The Osborne Court reasoned:

169. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Children's Legal Foundation at 19, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
170. Id.
171. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566-67.
172. Id. at 566.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 566-67 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
175. R. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTImS: THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 119 (1979) (stating
that "there are no definitive studies that demonstrate a cause and effect relationship between
[child] pornography and sex crimes"); Stanley, supra note 119, at 332-34.
176. Brief for Appellee at 19-21, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
177. See Osborne, 110 S.Ct. at 1696.
178. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567-68.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 43

Osborne points out that in Stanley we rejected Georgia's
argument that its prohibition on obscenity possession was a
necessary incident to its proscription on obscenity distribution. . . .This holding, however, must be viewed in light of
the weak interests asserted by the State in that case. Stanley
itself emphasized that we did not "mean to express any opinion on statutes making criminal possession of other types of
printed, filmed, or recorded materials. . . . In such cases,
compelling reasons may exist for overriding the right of the
individual to possess those materials."' 79
The Osborne Court's reference was to a passage in Stanley in which
the Stanley Court suggested that private possession of espionage material would not be protected. 180 In the federal espionage statute, possession of the printed material is only one element of the crime; the
primary element of the crime of espionage, however, is conveying the
material to a foreign power.181 Unlike child pornography, espionage
material is not possessed for personal use. Therefore, in citing the
espionage statute, the Stanley Court was not holding that there were
types of communicative material whose possession for personal use
could be prohibited.
The Osborne Court's decision to uphold a prohibition on the private
possession as an adjunct to a prohibition on commercial distribution
involved a serious incursion into the privacy right. As indicated, the
Stanley Court rejected the argument that prohibiting possession was
necessary to prohibit distribution.s 2 The Supreme Court in Stanley
held:
[W]e are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene materials is a necessary incident to statutory
schemes prohibiting distribution. That argument is based on
alleged difficulties of proving an intent to distribute or in
producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we
do not think that they would justify infringement of the
individual's right to read or observe what he pleases. Because

179. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11) (citation omitted).
180. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1989) (criminalizing the
possession of classified national security materials)).
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (1989) (making possession criminal when the possessor has
reason to believe that the information could be used to injure the United States).
182. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
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that right is so fundamental to our scheme of individual
liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need 18to
ease the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws. 3
Despite the state's greater interest in prohibiting child pornography
as opposed to obscenity, there is no difference in the logic of prohibiting
possession as a way to stop production and distribution. The Court's
statement in Stanley regarding "the individual's right to read or observe what he pleases"'1 applies equally to both child pornography

and obscenity.
In Osborne, the Court said that the state's interest in eliminating
child pornography is stronger because when dealing with child pornog-

raphy, the state is protecting a victim. 1 With obscenity, by the Court's

analysis, there is no victim1as However, the Court's reasoning in Stanley that the individual has a right 'to read what he or she pleases

applies with equal force to child pornography. A prohibition against
possession takes governmental regulation substantially farther than a
mere prohibition against production and distribution and infringes upon
an individual's right to view communicative material in the home.

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
186. Id. The Osborne Court distinguished regulation of child pornography from the regulation of private possession of obscenity which the Stanley Court found unconstitutional: Id. (citing
Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565). Unlike the obscenity regulation at issue in Stanley, "Ohio has enacted
[child pornography regulation] in order to protect the [child] victims." Id. But see A. DWORKIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981) (presenting a theory of gender inequality
based upon sexuality); MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1985) (arguing that pornography is neither harmless nor merely a product of
confused sexuality). MacKinnon describes how all women are victims of pornography:
[Pornography] eroticizes hierarchy, it sexualizes inequality. It makes dominance
and submission sex. Inequality is its central dynamic; the illusion of freedom coming
together with the reality of force is central to its working .... Pornography...
is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender
inequality.
Id. at 18. Cf. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 327-31 (1985) (holding that
ordinance proscribing trafficking in pornography, where pornography was defined as "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women," was an unconstitutional restraint on First Amendment
rights), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The Hudnut court recognized the damages flowing from
the depictions of women in pornography. Id. at 329. They found that:
Depictions of subordination tend to perpetuate subordination. The subordinate
status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at work, insult and injury
at home, battery, and rape on the streets .... "Pornography is central in creating
and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination."
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Producers and distributors are engaged in the child pornography business. A possessor is not. The possessor stands a step removed from
production and distribution. Thus, a prohibition on possession is not
justified as an adjunct to a prohibition on commercial production and
sale.
In the obscenity arena, the Supreme Court has held that no constitutional right exists to possess obscenity outside the home.187 Under
the Supreme Court's analysis in Ferber, child pornography, unlike
obscenity, may have serious artistic, literary, political, or scientific
value, or may appear in a larger work such as a book that has such
value. 1- A prohibition against the private possession of child pornography may therefore curtail legitimate First Amendment interests.
When legislatures act in an area where fundamental rights are affected, they must legislate in a fashion narrowly tailored to serve
their legitimate goals.19
There is no need to prohibit private possession in order to stop
the traffic in child pornography. The state's interest in regulating the
production and sale of child pornography is to protect children from
the harm suffered from being posed in sexual conduct and from having
the depictions circulated in commerce. However, an invasion into the
privacy of the home is not a narrowly tailored means of effectuating
that interest.
In addition to the many stated arguments that were rejected in
Osborne, the Supreme Court also rejected Osborne's argument that
Ohio should prohibit only production and distribution of child pornography in order to protect children from the possible harms that would
result from the pornography.19° The state's interest in eliminating the
trade in child pornography should be adequately served by regulating
production and distribution. A ban on private possession will not likely
prevent the production or distribution of child pornography because
private possession rarely comes to the attention of authorities.19 ' Consequently, the risk of detection is low. Only on those rare occasions

187. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
188. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (finding that the Miller obscenity test does not apply
in child pornography cases).
189. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (recognizing that when a state seeks to
regulate "fundamental rights," the state must assert a "compelling state interest" and the state's
regulations must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.").
190. Osbornie, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
191. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 119, at 105 ("Sexual abuse is the
ultimate damage to be prevented; criminalizing transfer or possession - besides raising constitutional problems - is a tragic example of law enforcement 'too little, too late.").
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in which authorities have obtained a warrant will they be able to
search for and discover privately possessed child pornography. Therefore, a ban on the private possession of child pornography holds little
prospect of preventing the production and distribution of child pornography.
The frailty of a prohibition on private possession as a means to
eradicate child pornography is relevant in determining whether such
a prohibition is constitutional. When fundamental rights are at issue,
a state may use only the least restrictive means available to achieve
legitimate goals. 192 Further, the means utilized merit particular
scrutiny when First and Fourth Amendment rights are being invaded. 1 In that context, the value to the state of prohibiting the
private possession of child pornography must be weighed against the
privacy right to receive communicative material in the home.

VIII. THE NATURE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Child pornography, like obscene material, is communicative in
nature. This does not mean that a state may not regulate it, but any
prohibition must be assessed from the standpoint of the First Amendment. Until Osborne, the First Amendment had always prevailed and
the Supreme Court had not authorized a prohibition against the private
possession of any type of communicative material. The Osborne decision cut against the spirit of the First Amendment and retreated from
this long-standing history of case law which refused to ban the private
possession of communicative materials.
The First Amendment protects all forms of communicative material.'19 In Ferber, the Supreme Court stated that child pornography
was "without the protection of the First Amendment.' 1 95 That sweep-

192. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1960) (holding that a state's policy requiring
teachers to divulge all organizational relationships was too broadly drawn to justify the state's
otherwise "legitimate inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers").
193. Id.
194. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1989). The Johnson Court decided whether
burning the United States flag was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 403. The Court held that flag-burning, when "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication," implicated the First Amendment. Id. at 406 (citation omitted). In reaching its conclusion,
the Court discussed other forms of conduct which possessed communicative elements sufficient
to "bring the First Amendment into play." Id. at 404. These forms of conduct include the
wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, a sit-in by
blacks to protest segregation, the wearing of United States military uniforms to protest the
Vietnam conflict, and taping a peace sign to a flag in protest of the Kent State tragedy. Id. at
404-05.
195. Ferber,458 U.S. at 764.
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ing statement, however, did not necessarily mean that a state may
prohibit private possession. Dissenting in Osborne, Justice Brennan
described the Ferber holding as doing nothing more than placing "child
pornography on the same level of First Amendment protection as
obscene adult pornography, meaning that its production and distribution could be proscribed." 196
The Ferber Court also noted that "laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expres-''
sion by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy."'
Although the First Amendment does not protect the Ferber commercial production and distribution of child pornography 9 s and the Osborne
private possession of child pornography, 1'9 a state does not have the
power to punish any and all acts associated with child pornography.
If, for example, a photograph constituting child pornography is published in an article about child pornography, a state could not prosecute
every newscarrier who delivers the newspaper, every purchaser of
the newspaper, or every trash hauler who carries the newspaper from
the purchaser's home. 200 Clearly, the First Amendment would act to
limit the state's actions. Before the state seeks to prohibit communicative material, the state must first prove that prohibiting a particular
act is necessary to avert the social harm the state seeks to prevent.2° '
In this sense, child pornography is material within the ambit of First
22
Amendment protection. 0
The First Amendment protects any material that conveys a message. A state could argue that child pornography does not convey any
message. 203 In First Amendment analysis, however, the Supreme
Court has not distinguished among materials based on the Court's

196. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at. 1713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
198. Id. at 765.
199. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
200. Cf. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (permitting criminal sanctions for obscenity and child
pornography only on proof of scienter).
201. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97 (finding that Ohio's proscription of the viewing and
possession of child pornography were constitutional because of Ohio's assertions that proscription
would protect the victims of child pornography).
202. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 762-63 (suggesting that, although it is unlikely, visual depictions
of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct may constitute an "important and necessary part of
a literary performance or scientific or educational work"). The Ferber Court pointed out, however,
that if a depiction of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals was
necessary for literary or artistic value, "a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger could be utilized." Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
203. See id. at 762 (finding that the message value of child pornography is, at best, nominal).
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perception of the value of the message being conveyed. With obscenity,
the Court allowed the prohibition on production and distribution, but
the material still enjoys First Amendment protection to the extent
that obscenity is allowed to be possessed in the home. 2 4
Persons receive messages from various kinds of written and visual
materials. Although regulation of these various kinds of materials is
permitted, 205 the material is still considered communicative. Therefore,
a prohibition will only be upheld upon a showing of a compelling state
interest.2
With child pornography, no compelling state interest exists to justify a complete ban on the private possession of child pornography.
In his concurring opinion in Ferber, Justice Stevens wrote that child
pornography was, for purposes of First Amendment analysis, "marginal speech [of a] lower quality than most other types of communication. ' ' 27 Despite that view, Stevens joined Brennan's dissent in Osborne and held that the individual's right to private possession of child
pornography outweighed the state's interest in its prohibition. 2 8
Advocates in favor of broad regulation of child pornography and
obscenity have attempted to separate pornographic and obscene materials from other forms of protected "speech."' "Though comprised of
words and pictures, pornography does not have the special properties
that single out speech for special protection; it is more akin to a sexual
aid than a communicative expression. ' 21 However, that analysis of
communication is overly simplified. The various forms of communication cannot be readily categorized in terms of the human faculty to
which they appeal. Any form of communication may appeal to the
rational individual's emotions, be it a political tract, a painting, or a
2 11
poem.

204. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559, 561.
205. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18.
206. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696-97.
207. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring).
208. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1712-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. See Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE L.J. 589, 602-08
(contending that because pornography is "more akin to a sexual aid than a communicative
expression," it is a low-value form of speech which should not be entitled to protection equal

to other forms of speech).
210. Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
211. Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989 DuKE L.J.
420, 428-31. Chevigny responds to Sunstein's argument that pornography is undeserving of

heightened constitutional protection due to its non-cognitive value only as a "sexual aid":
[W]e do not know how a pornographic film can bypass the visual sense, and
through magic arouse a person to an act of sexual degradation. Rather, viewers
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An individual's right to receive information is not dependent upon

the nature and character of the information. 2' 2 The Supreme Court
concluded in Stanley that the "right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society. '213 Brennan captured this aspect of the First Amendment in his
dissent in Osborne: "When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed
lofty, it is easy to find restrictions on them invalid. But were the
First Amendment limited to such discourse, our freedom would be
sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne's pictures may be distasteful, but the
Constitution guarantees ...his right to possess them privately .... 214
Individuals have the right to think their own thoughts, seek their
own information, and come to their own truths. 2 5 This freedom extends
to all forms of information, regardless of how others, including governmental authorities, assess the information's value.216 Ideas may not
be suppressed merely because they are unpopular. 2 7 Even offensive
messages, so long as the means of communication are peaceful, are
8
not required to "meet standards of acceptability.'

draw a pattern of sexual relations from their imagination and that pattern arouses.
• . . Pornographic film scenes and still photos also can be reassembled to make a
rather different piece of propaganda - an appeal against pornography in favor of
censorship.... Pornographic scenes thus may be arousing, but the action or belief
that they arouse depends on each viewer's imagination and beliefs.
Id.
212. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1717 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-66.
216. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("We do not accede to appellees'
suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of
ideas."). The Winters Court considered whether New York could punish a bookseller for selling
a magazine entitled "Headquarters Detective, True Cases from the Police Blotter." Id. at 508.
The bookseller had been convicted for violating a New York statute which penalized distributors
of any printed material "principally made up of. . .accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures ...
of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime." Id. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the bookseller's
conviction by reading the statute to prohibit only those materials which would "[incite] violence
or depraved crimes." Id. at 518. However, the Supreme Court held the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 519.
217. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89
(1959) (stating that the Constitution protects ideas although they are unconventional and shared
only by a minority); see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23-26 (1971) (protecting open communication of all ideas, no matter how offensive, is necessary to enable the development of diverse
and novel ideas).
218. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (holding that
organization's distributing leaflets to protest real estate agent's actions which resulted in racial
integration of previously "white" neighborhoods was protected expression under the First
Amendment, even though the views expressed in the leaflets may be "offensive to others").
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Additionally, even if a depiction of unclothed minors conveys a
message of sexual attraction, the state has no interest in suppressing
that message as long as it is conveyed in the privacy of an individual's
home with no threat to others. While controlling "the moral content
of a person's thought . . . may be a noble purpose . . .it is wholly
inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. ' ' 219 Indeed,
in Ferber, the Court decided on the need for a category broader than
obscenity for depictions of children because the Court saw a justification for regulating depictions of children engaged in sexual conduct.-O
The state's interest overshadowed the possibility that the depictions
might appear in a work that, taken as a whole, contained serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.01 By recognizing that
child pornography may appear in a work of value, the Court thus
acknowledged that child pornography could be material of First
Amendment significance.2
The possession of a photograph or book is a communication held
in abeyance until the possessor views the material. The ideas conveyed
may be good or bad, noble or base, but simply receiving the material
is not a crime. The state has no right to control the content of a
person's mind.- One student of the First Amendment writes that
"external forces - Congress, state legislatures, or the Court itself
. . . [cannot] determine what communications or forms of expression
are of value to the individual; how the individual is to develop his
'2
faculties is a choice for the individual to make. M
Although the Supreme Court in Osborne said that it was not creating new law,5 allowing a ban on the private possession of child pornography is hard to reconcile with the Court's broad dictum in Stanley:

219. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
220. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
221. Id. The Court articulated a standard to define obscenity in Miller v. California. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
222. See Schauer, Codifying the FirstAmendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT.
REv. 285, 304 ("[The category that results from Ferberis not defined by the absence of First
Amendment value."). The Court's conclusion that the category of child pornography should be
more broadly defined than obscenity left two situations unaddressed. Id. at 297. "In one case

a depiction of children engaged in sexual conduct might itself have serious value, a situation to
be distinguished from the case in which a valueless depiction is part of a larger work containing

value elsewhere." Id. at 297-98 (citations omitted).
223.
224.
225.

See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
Redish, supra note 21, at 637.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695-96 (distinguishing the holding of Stanley, in which the

Court struck down a Georgia statute criminalizing the private possession of obscene material,
from the Osborne facts, where private possession of child pornography was involved).
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"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that the State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own home, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. '' 2 6 When the state
dictates what writings or depictions a person may or may not possess,
the state begins a dangerous process of censorship.
The First Amendment protects an individual's right to receive
information. -7 The Fourth Amendment right to privacy reinforces this
First Amendment right by assuring that individuals will receive information free from government interference.- Justice Brandeis captured this notion best when discussing the Fourth Amendment in a
wiretap case.29 Brandeis said that the drafters of the Constitution
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found
in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.?z0
Child pornography is not necessarily obscene.Y 1 Standing alone,
child pornography may have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.-2 Child pornography may also be contained in a larger
work that has such value.- The purpose of regulating child pornog-

226. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
227. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that right
to receive information is "an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press"); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (finding "a First Amendment right to receive information and ideas"); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("[The] right of freedom of
speech and press ... necessarily protects the right to receive it."); Emerson, Legal Foundations
qf the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2 (stating that "[t]he right to know fits readily
into the first amendment"); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions oj Free Expression,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1863 (1983) (stating that the right of "expression includes the interest
in receiving ideas and images").
228. Note, supra note 227, at 1864 ("The interest in privacy, too, intersects with expression.
Privacy may be viewed as the interest of an individual or group in forming an inner life. It
involves the channelling of thought, belief, and sensation as the expression of autonomous
personality.").
229. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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raphy is not to purge the marketplace of the ideas that the information
is communicating. Rather, the purpose of regulating child pornography
is to protect the young persons used in the production of the depictions.23 Because child pornography may contain serious literary merit,
a prohibition against the private possession of child pornography would
seem to be more intrusive on the First Amendment right to receive
information than a prohibition against the private possession of obscene
materials.
IX.

THE HAZARDS OF PROHIBITING POSSESSION

Offenses which limit what one may possess are problematic because of the difficulty in determining whether the person was aware
of the character or existence of the item. State statutes often define
"possess" in ways that do not ensure whether the possessor was aware
of these factors. For example, the New York Penal Law defines "possess" as having "physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion
or control over tangible property." 2 Thus, an item may be "possessed"
if the item is in a pocket or handbag even if the person is unaware
the item is there. The person may have placed the item there without
realizing what it was, or the item may have been placed there by
another person. Even a person who is aware of the existence of the
item may not be aware that the item is, for example, a narcotic drug,
obscene material, or child pornography.
When dealing with items found in a person's premises, the possession issue is usually resolved by proving the person had control over
the premises.2 6 Thus, an item found in a person's apartment or house
will usually be sufficient to support a conviction for possession. Courts
also have convicted individuals for possession of illegal items even
where the person was not the sole occupant of the dwelling.32 7 It would
be easy not to know about the existence of a particular photograph
in an apartment an individual shares with another person. Also, a
person may move into an apartment in which a previous tenant has

See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 10.00 (Consol. 1991).
236. E.g., State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706, 714 (1972) (finding that prosecutor sufficiently established defendant's possession of marijuana where defendant was "within
three to four feet of the marijuana... and no one else was in the room," or in defendant's house).
237. E.g., People v. Casanova, 117 A.D.2d 742, 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y.-App.
Div.) (finding constructive possession justified despite lack of exclusive possession when other
incriminating circumstances were present), appeal denied, 67 N.Y.2d 940, 494 N.E.2d 117, 502
N.Y.S.2d 1032 (1986).
234.
235.
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left certain items or a visitor might inadvertently leave a prohibited
item in another person's home. With photographs, the problem is
particularly acute because photographs are typically small. Furthermore, many people keep such a large number of photographs that
they might not notice that a particular photograph was inadvertently
left behind by another person.
In a number of cases, individuals have been charged with possession
of child pornography after giving film to a drug store for developing.When the film turned out to contain child pornography, the individuals
were arrested and charged.- 9 In one such case, an individual's children
had taken the photographs without the person's knowledge.A 9 The
person was arrested despite the fact that there was no evidence that
the person knew that questionable photographs were on the film taken
to the drug store. 41
In Osborne, the Supreme Court did not allude to these difficulties.
However, these problematic issues are relevant when determining
whether a state has a compelling interest in prohibiting the private
possession of child pornography. If prohibiting possession applies to
those situations in which the existence or nature of the item is in
doubt, then the state's interest in protecting the children depicted in
the material is not being served. A ban on possession of child pornography can be effective only against those who are aware that they
possess such material.
A strict mens rea requirement regarding the possession of child
pornography can partially ameliorate the problem. For example, the
Minnesota child pornography statute requires that the person possess
the material "knowing or with reason to know its content and character. 4 2 Knowledge of the possessed item also may be inferred from
the circumstances. A New York court deciding a drug possession case
inferred knowledge of the substance's possession by the attendant
circumstances.24 3 The court reasoned "that the possessor knows what

238. See, e.g., People v. Lerch, 108 Ill. 2d 580, 483 N.E.2d 888 (1985) (reviewing conviction
of Lerch for photographing his six-year-old child in the nude while the child played with her
mother on the Lerch's living room floor before a bath), noted in Stanley, supra note 119, at
339. See also Stanley, supra note 119, at 343-44 (discussing arrest of William Kelly after having
film developed which contained, unknown to him, pictures of his children in "lascivious poses,"
which his children had taken of each other).
239. See Stanley, supra note 119, at 339, 343-44.
240. Id. at 343-44.
241. Id.
242. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247 (West 1987).
243. People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285, 277 N.E.2d 396, 400, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 348
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972). The Reisman court decided whether knowledge of
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he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is in his hands, on
his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises." 244
In Osborne, the trial judge instructed the jury that possession
meant "to have, hold, control, or to exercise dominion or custody over
a thing or object. ' 1245 This instruction did not require a finding that
Osborne was aware that the depictions existed. The Ohio Supreme
Court, on the other hand, required proof that Osborne recklessly possessed child pornography.2 6 According to the Ohio Supreme Court, a
possessor of child pornography possesses it recklessly if, "with heedless
indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known
risk" that it is child pornography.?7 Thus, a possessor who does not
know of the item's existence or character, would be guilty if the
possessor was simply aware of a risk that the item might be child
pornography.
Even with a strict mens rea requirement in a possession offense,
non-aware possessors remain at risk. A possessor's guilt or innocence
depends upon whether the trier of fact decides that the possessor was
aware of the existence and content of the item. The possessor's credibility while testifying may be decisive. When dealing with child pornography, the issue of knowledge or recklessness is particularly delicate because inferring knowledge or recklessness often depends upon
many factors. These factors include the age of the person depicted
and the pornographic character of the depiction. In cases such as
these, an underage person may appear older. Also, the pornographic
character of the depiction depends upon many factorsm including the
Osborne Court's less than precise definition of pornography.?s 9

possession could be attributed to a person who consigned, and later accepted delivery of a carton
filled with marijuana. Id. at 281-82, 277 N.E.2d at 397-98, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46. The court
reasoned that an inference of possession was justified or "probabilities based on experience"
supported the inference. Id. at 286, 277 N.E.2d at 400, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 349. Finding the
"probabilities justifying the inference of knowledge" to be "unusually impressive," the court
held that the inference was permissible. Id. at 282, 277 N.E.2d at 401, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 350.

244. Id.
245. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 120, State v. Osborne, No. 14333 (Franklin County
Mun. Court Sept. 24, 1985).
246. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 253, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1368-69 (1988), rev'd sub
nora. Ohio v. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
247. Id. at 253, 525 N.E.2d at 1368-69 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.22(C)
(Anderson 1987)).
248. See infra text accompanying notes 284-88.
249. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1699 n.11.
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In Ferber, the Supreme Court held that "some element of scienter
on the part of the defendant" must be proved. However, what level
of mens rea the Supreme Court intended to be proved is unclear. In
a federal prosecution for filming a minor in sexually explicit conduct,
the court permitted the accused to assert a defense of reasonable
mistake of age if the accused believed the minor was an adult.-, To
be convicted, the possessor was required to be aware of both the
existence and character of the child pornography.- 2 In Osborne, the
Supreme Court merely alluded to the scienter requirement in ruling
on a procedural issue, but provided no new insight as to how the issue
should be resolved in future cases.2
The "recklessness" level of mens rea approved by the Osborne
Court does not adequately limit the range of persons who might be
found guilty of possession of child pornography. Before a state has a
compelling interest in prohibiting child pornography possession, it
would seem that the state first must prove that the possessor was
aware of both the existence of the pornography and of its pornographic
character. This would mandate that the state prove that the possessor
had knowledge of both the type of depiction and the age of the person
depicted. If the accused does not know that the person depicted is a
minor, the rationale for overriding First and Fourth Amendment rights
crumbles. The accused cannot be suspected of using the photographs
to seduce minors if the accused does not know that the person depicted
in the photograph is a minor.
The danger of convicting persons without establishing their knowledge of the existence or character of the material militates against

250. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-55 (1959)
(requiring scienter before a bookseller can be prosecuted for selling obscene material).
251. United States v. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. 1421, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1987), vacated, mand.
granted, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 858 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
defendant may assert a reasonable mistake defense because abolition of pornography is limited
by the First Amendment; punishment for unintentional violations may unduly burden producers
of nonpornographic expressions, and it is unfair to punish pornography employers for a "factual
error, which might have been the product of trickery and deception"). Kantor is noted in
Christiansen, The Child Protection Act: A Blanket Prohibition Smothering Constitutionally
Protected Expression, 9 Loy. ENT. L.J. 301 (1989); Peetzer, United States v. United States
District Court (Kantor): ProtectingChildren from Sexual Exploitation or Protecting the Pornography Producer?, 20 PAC. L.J. 1343 (1989).
252. Kantor, 677 F. Supp. at 1429. The Supreme Court in Osborne decided not to rule on
Osborne's challenge to a similar jury instruction because his counsel at trial had not objected.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1703.
253. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1703. However, the Court decided that scienter was required
under Ohio law. Id.
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permitting a ban on the private possession of child pornography. When
the possession of the material is in the home, a prohibition against
possession is even more dangerous. The harm to Fourth Amendment
interests is significant because the enforcement techniques necessary
to discover child pornography in the home are highly intrusive. This
was exemplified in Osborne where police searched dresser drawers
until finding photograph albums and then perused large numbers of
photographs until finding four which formed the basis of the charge
against Osborne.3
X.

PROHIBITING THE VIEWING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

Osborne was convicted for possession of child nudity material
under Ohio Revised Code section 2907.323(A)(3).? The Ohio statute
also forbids viewing child pornography.? 6 In fact, this statute alone
among the post-Ferber statutes includes the additional prohibition
against the act of viewing child nudity material.2 7 Obscenity statutes
also typically forbid possession, but not viewing. This Ohio provision
is apparently the first statute to outlaw the viewing of communicative
material.
The result of Ohio's far-reaching statute is that a non-possessor of
child pornography who inadvertently views child pornography may be
prosecuted under the statute. Thus, a person who passes by a drive-in
movie theater where pornographic material is being shown could be
convicted under the statute. Similarly, a visitor to a museum exhibit
at which a single work on display constituted child pornography could
be convicted under Ohio's statute.2 This prohibition takes the scope
of illegality even farther beyond the commercial production and distribution that was at issue in Ferber.One who simply views child pornography is even farther removed from the commercial child pornography
industry than one who possesses.
Further, Ohio's statute does not even require that the accused
"intend" to have the material come within his or her line of vision.259

254. Id. at 1692, 1712.
255. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
256. Id. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that "no person shall.. . view any material
or performance that shows a minor who is not the person's child or ward in a state of nudity.
." Id. (emphasis added).

257. See id. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 907.323(A)(3) with the other post-Ferber
statutes cited supra at note 41.
258. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1706 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to a 1990
museum exhibition of the work of Robert Mapplethorpe).
259. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (requiring only that a person "view" the
proscribed material to violate the statute). However, Ohio Revised Code § 2901.21(B) provides,
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A conviction will lie if the person was aware of a risk that the material
°
would contain child pornography and would come within view.
Even though Osborne was not charged with "viewing" child pornography, Osborne challenged the "viewing" element of the Ohio statute
as evidence of overbreadth in the statute. 26' Under the overbreadth
doctrine, the Supreme Court had to determine the "viewing" element
was constitutionally valid before a conviction under the statute could
be upheld. 262 The Court determined that the viewing element was not
overbroad but did not explain the reason for its decision.2 - The Court
mentioned "viewing" in the concluding sentence of its analysis of Osborne's privacy challenge: "Given the gravity of the State's interests
in this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the
possession and viewing of child pornography. ' '26 Previously, the Court
had mentioned viewing only obliquely in a discussion which had been
directed mainly at possession rather than viewing. 265 The Court held
that the "State's ban on possession and viewing encourages the posses'266
sors of these materials to destroy them.
While a ban on possession may encourage a possessor to destroy
the child pornography, a ban on viewing will not. A viewer and a
possessor are distinct individuals under the statute. 267 Thus, the
Court's assertion that a ban on viewing encourages destruction of child
pornography makes no sense. The only way in which the Court's
assertion could make sense would be if a viewer were to destroy child
pornography that belonged to another. Presumably, however, the
viewer would have no right to destroy another person's child pornography.
in pertinent part, that "when the section defining an offense . . . neither specifies culpability
nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient culpability to
commit the offense." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B). Thus, "recklessness is the culpable
mental state required to constitute a violation of [Ohio Revised Code] § 2907.323(A)(3)." Young,
525 N.E.2d at 1369; see supra text accompanying notes 246-49.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 246-49.
261. Brief for Appellant at 41, Osbornze (No. 88-5986).
262. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (holding that a statute may be
facially invalid when it is "substantially overbroad," or when the statute may deter protected
speech to an extent which justifies invalidating the statute). Thus, the Osborne Court had to
overturn Osborne's conviction if it found any element of the Ohio statute to be "substantially
overbroad." Id.; see also Quigley & Shank, supra note 89, at _
(discussing the Osborne
Court's overbreadth analysis).
263. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1698.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 1695-97.
266. Id. at 1697 (emphasis added).
267. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (stating that "[n]o person shall . . .
possess or view" child pornography) (emphasis added).
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The Court's conclusion that a ban on viewing is constitutionally
valid is curious when compared to the Court's reasons for upholding
a ban on possession. As indicated in the Osborne opinion, the reasons
for upholding a ban on the private possession of child pornography
were three-fold: bans on production and distribution were insufficient
to stop the dissemination of child pornography, child pornography
permanently records the abuse of the child victim, and child molesters
use child pornography as a tool for the seduction of minors.m These
rationales, however, do not justify proscribing the "viewing" of child
pornography. A non-possessing viewer of child pornography has nothing to do with the dissemination or preservation. of child pornography.
A non-possessing viewer cannot use it to seduce other children. A
non-possessing viewer can only view the materials.
Ohio's ban on the viewing of child pornography is the kind of
legislation that courts sometimes hold violates substantive due process
rights by forbidding an act that the state simply has no business
prohibiting. 269 The prohibition is particularly dangerous because a First
Amendment interest is involved. To enact a valid regulation affecting
speech, a state must have a compelling interest in the harm it seeks
to avert and may use only the least restrictive means necessary to
avert that harm. 7 A complete ban on the viewing of child pornography
is hardly a necessary means to stop the production of child pornography. The non-possessory viewer's relationship to the child pornography industry is far too marginal, and a state cannot effectively
enforce a ban on viewing.
XI.

SEXUAL CONDUCT AS AN ELEMENT OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

Most of the post-Ferberstatutes dealing with child pornography
enumerated certain kinds of sexual acts that were prohibited and
added the broader category of "lewd exhibition of the genitals."1

268. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
269. See Alegata v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 287, 297, 231 N.E.2d 201, 207 (1967) (holding
that vagrancy statute was invalid "as repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment" for seeking "to [criminalize] conduct which cannot fairly be classed as such" and
thus constituted "an invalid exercise of the police power"); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309,
312, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967) (holding that vagrancy statute was
invalid "on the ground that it violates due process and constitutes an overreaching of the proper
limitations of the police power" and concluding that the statute "unreasonably [criminalizes]
conduct... which in no way impinges on the rights or interests of others and which has in
no way been demonstrated to have anything more than the most tenuous connection with
prevention of crime.").
270. See infra text accompanying notes 354-67.
271. The post-Ferberstatutes are cited supra at note 41.
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Four of these statutes omitted this formulation requiring instead that
the depiction be of one person sexually touching another.2 In addition
to prohibiting the possession of depictions of minors involved in sexual
conduct,273 Ohio enacted a statute titled "Illegal use of minor in nudityoriented material or performance. '274 This statute, by regulating depictions of nudity, is broader than any other post-Ferber statute. The
Ohio statute, under which the Osborne charge was filed, defined the
material as anything showing "a minor who is not the person's child
or ward in a state of nudity. 27 5 Ohio statutorily defined nudity as a
depiction of human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a full, opaque covering, or of a female
breast with less than a full, opaque covering of any portion
thereof below the top of the nipple, or of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.2 7 6
In Ferber,the Supreme Court held that material must depict sexual
conduct in order to come within the classification of child pornography.2 77 The New York statute at issue in Ferber covered "actual or
simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of
the genitals."278 In the Ferber case, the acts depicted were those of
1

masturbation.279

The Ferber Court made special note of the section in the statute
covering "lewd exhibition of the genitals," because this was the only
category in the definition that did not involve sexual activity related
to sexual touching of oneself or another person.28 The Court noted
272. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 573.037 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (requiring that the material show
"a minor participating or engaging in sexual conduct"); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.730
(Michie Supp. 1989) (requiring that material "[depict] a person under the age of 16 years engaging
in or simulating, or assisting others to engage in or simulate, sexual conduct"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (Anderson Supp. 1990) (requiring that material "shows a minor participating or engaging in sexual activity"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (Supp. 1991)
(requiring depiction of a minor "engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such
an act").
273. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322(A)(5) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
274. Id. § 2907.323.
275. Id. § 2907.323(A)(3). Certain statutory exceptions are provided: possession for "artistic,
medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose"; and
possession by written consent of the parent. Id. § 2907.33(A)(1)(a), (b).
276. Id. § 2907.01(H).
277. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
278. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (Consol. 1989).
279. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752.
280. Id. at 765.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss2/2

38

Quigley: Child Pornography and the Right to Privacy
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

that the phrase 'qewd exhibition of the genitals" had been used in the
case of Miller v. California21 as an example of one kind of depiction
states might regulate as obscenity. 28 But the Court did not attempt
to define the phrase in either Miller or Ferber.
The FerberCourt recognized that the term "lewd" was difficult to
define and limit.3 In deciding that the New York statute was not
overbroad, the Court recognized that some applications of the statute
might infringe upon protected speech.2 In that regard, the Court
stated: "Nor will we assume that the New York courts will widen the
possibly invalid reach of the statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on 'lewd exhibition[s] of the genitals.' Under
these circumstances, [section] 263.15 is 'not substantially overbroad . .

.

The term 'lewd exhibition of the genitals" was part of most postFerber statutes.2 However, the term is problematic. It is unclear
how a "lewd exhibition of the genitals" differs from any other depiction
of the genitals. A photograph showing a nude frontal view of a child
walking towards the camera would probably not constitute lewdness.
By contrast, if the child had a coy facial expression, one could argue
that this constitutes a 'lewd exhibition of the genitals." The term
might also require that something specific to the genitals be lewd, for
example, that the genitals be shown in a state of sexual excitement.2
If read broadly, however, the term "lewd exhibition of the genitals"
may encompass any depiction of nude children, which the FerberCourt
had defined as protected speech.2
The United States Supreme Court in Osborne decided that the
Ohio Supreme Court had construed the Ohio statute to include the

281. 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
282. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
283. See id. at 773.
284. Id.; see also id. at 764 ('there are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography
which, like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment").
285. Id. at 773-74 (citation omitted).
286. For citation of the post-Ferber statutes, see supra note 41.
287. Frederick Schauer suggested that the term 'lewd exhibition of the genitals" might be
read more broadly when applied to depictions of children than when applied, in defining obscenity,
to depictions of adults. Schauer, supra note 222, at 294-95. Schauer argues by analogy to
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), which permitted states to set a lower standard
for obscenity sold to minors, as opposed to adults. That analogy would not seem to hold. The
fact that states can be more protective of minors than of adults as regards the type of material
they may read or view should not control the definition of the material in question.
288. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 213 (1975) and indicating that nudity, without more, is protected expression).
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lewd exhibition of the genitals.- 9 However, in Brennan's dissent, he
challenged this reading of the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling. - ' Brennan
pointed out that the Ohio Supreme Court had not limited "lewd exhibition" to involve exhibition of the genitals.29 The intermediate appellate court had used the phrase "lewd exhibition of the genitals,"- but
the Ohio Supreme Court dropped the "of the genitals" language in its
own formulation .293 The Ohio Supreme Court wrote: "[i]t is true that
R.C. 2907.323(A)(3) does not expressly limit the prohibited state of
nudity to a lewd exhibition or a graphic focus on the genitals."'- The
United States Supreme Court, however, did not say how the Ohio
Supreme Court's formulation was construed, but Brennan pointed out
that the Ohio Supreme Court did not link the term "lewd exhibition"
to the word "genitals. ' ' 295 In Brennan's opinion, lewd exhibitions of
"nudity" were also within the statute's purview. 96
In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court would have found it difficult to
confine the Ohio statute to depictions of the genitals only because
Ohio's statutory definition of "nudity" also included display of the
buttocks, the pubic area, and the female breast, in addition to the
genitals.297 Brennan noted, "the broad definition of nudity in the Ohio
statutory scheme means that 'child pornography' could include any
photograph depicting a 'lewd exhibition' of even a small portion of a
'
minor's buttocks or any part of the female breast below the nipple. "Thus, in Brennan's opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court could not have
limited the coverage of the Ohio statute to cover "lewd exhibition of
the genitals" without ignoring the statutory definition of "nudity."
The United States Supreme Court reasoned, however, that
whether or not the Ohio Supreme Court had limited "lewd exhibition"
to "genitals" only was irrelevant. 2- "[The] distinction between body
areas and specific body parts is constitutionally [in]significant: the

289. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1699 n.11.
290. Id. at 1707 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
291. Id.
292. State v. Osborne, No. 85AP-945 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 1986) (WESTLAW, 1986 WL
6681), affid sub nom. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 525 N.E.2d 788 (1988), rei"d sub
nom. Ohio v. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
293. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1707 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294. State v. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d 249, 251, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1367 (1988), rerd sub norn.
Ohio v. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
295. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1707 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
296. Id.
297. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(H) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
298. Osborme, 110 S. Ct. at 1708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 1699 n.11.
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crucial question is whether the depiction is lewd, not whether the
depiction happens to focus on the genitals or the buttocks."3 °
The Osborne Court thus expanded Ferber-defined child pornography beyond lewd exhibition of the genitals onlyY°1 This expansion
creates the possibility that 'lewd exhibition" may be found where
genitals are not shown, but where the pose is deemed to be seductive.
Thus, the line between child pornography and nudity becomes extremely difficult to discern. The apparent meaning of Ferber and Osborne is that depictions of nudity are protected unless the nudity is
"lewd." Because the Court is not concerned with which body parts
are shown, the Court did not exclude the possibility that a depiction
of a face might be construed as being "lewd."
The Supreme Court's ready acceptance of 'lewd exhibition" in Osborne is at odds with the Court's concern over similar phrasing in
Ferber. The FerberCourt expressed concern over the broad construction of the New York statutory formulation of the term "lewd exhibition of the genitals." 3° Because the term appeared at the end of a
listing of several sexual acts, the Court said that the term must be
read narrowly. 30 The Court said that it would not assume "that the
New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach of the statute
by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on 'lewd exhibition[s] of the genitals."'304 The Ohio Supreme Court in Osborne,
however, expanded the scope of that formulation. This was the exact
result that the United States Supreme Court in Ferber had warned
against. In contrast, the Osborne Court was unconcerned that the
statute's reach had been greatly expanded.
Beyond 'lewd exhibition," the Ohio Supreme Court determined
that depictions might also fall within the ambit of the Ohio statute if
they involved a "graphic focus on the genitals. 30 5 The formulation of
"graphic focus on the genitals" did not require lewdness and was
absent from the New York statute at issue in Ferber. 306 The Ohio

300. Id. While the Supreme Court thus did not require the depiction of any particular body
parts, the Ohio statute did. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(H). Thus, the Court's statement
here that depiction of certain body parts is not required may be taken as dictum.
301. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-74.
302.

See id.

303. Id. This is an application of the principle of statutory construction ejusdem generis.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773.
305. Young, 37,Ohio St. 3d at 252, 525 N.E.2d at 1368.
306. See supra text accompanying note 280.
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Supreme Court's formulation thus introduced a term that had not
appeared in other statutes that had come before the United States
Supreme Court.
The formulation "graphic focus on the genitals," even more clearly
than "lewd exhibition," covered depictions that involved no sexual
conduct. The United States Supreme Court, however, accepted this
formulation without discussion, mentioning it in a footnote only.3
Brennan, however, called the Ohio Supreme Court's "graphic focus
on the genitals" formulation "a stranger to obscenity regulation. '"
Brennan concluded that the formulation "appears to involve nothing
more than a subjective estimation of the centrality or prominence of
the genitals in a picture."30 9 According to Brennan, this definition was
"dependent on the perspective and idiosyncrasies of the observer" and
was "unconnected to whether the material at issue merits constitutional protection.lo [For example,] Michelangelo's 'David,' might be
said to have a 'graphic focus' on the genitals, for it plainly portrays
them in a manner unavoidable to even a casual observer." ' 3 11 Brennan
expressed concern that the Supreme Court had permitted Ohio to
regulate depictions of nudity: "[T]he depictions of nude children on
the friezes that adorn our Courtroom" could come within this formulation.a1 2 "Even a photograph of a child running naked on the beach
or playing in the bathtub might run afoul of the law, depending on
33
the focus and camera angle.' 1
A photograph showing a child posed in a sexually suggestive manner carries some of the harm to which the Supreme Court alluded to

307. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1699 n.11.
308. Id. at 1711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
312. Id.
313. Id. The Third Circuit took a stricter view in construing the Child Protection Act of
1984, which regulates depictions of "sexually explicit conduct," defined to include "lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), (2)(E). In United States v. Villard,
885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989), the photographs at issue showed a boy "from the head down to
the knees," and the boy's penis was in a state of "three quarters erection." Id. at 123. The
Court had to determine whether this was a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area."
It said:
If the photographs showed the boy's body from head to knees, they may have
constituted closeup photographs of the boy's body, but would seem not to constitute
closeup photographs of the boy's genitals. Moreover, simply because the boy had
a partial erection does not necessarily mean that the erection was the focus of the
photograph.
Id. (citation omitted).
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The child may feel embarrassed over having posed for
in Ferber.
the picture. Absent some sexual touching, however, the line between
child pornography and nudity is impossible to draw. 3 15 Lewdness is
too subjective a criterion to provide a line between depictions whose
possession the Constitution protects and those which the Constitution
does not protect. Some jurors might find any photograph of a nude
child to be "lewd." The Ohio Supreme Court's formulation, with the
United States Supreme Court's approval, leaves no clear line between
6
child pornography and nudity.3

XII.

ILLEGAL SEXUAL CONDUCT AS AN ELEMENT OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

In Osborne, the United States Supreme Court overlooked a key
element of previously defined child pornography, namely, the illegal
nature of the conduct being depicted. A requisite of a child pornog317
raphy prohibition is that the depicted sexual conduct be unlawful.
In fact, in a pre-Osborne decision, the Ohio Supreme Court found that
child pornography involves "physical, mental and sexual abuse," and
that "[t]he depictions sought to be banned... are but memorializations
of cruel mistreatment and unlawful conduct. '' 318 In Ferber, the United

314. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
315. Ohio argued that even if no sexual conduct occurs in a photograph depicting a nude
child, such conduct may have taken place before or after the photograph was taken. Brief for
Appellee at 35 n.16, Osborne (No. 88-5986) (citing Note, Protection of Children From Use in
Pornography:Toward Constitutionaland EnforceableLegislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295,
300 (1979) (authored by T. Christopher Donnelly)). This rationale was not mentioned by the
Court, and it would seem insufficient to warrant a prohibition against possession. The fact that
unlawful conduct may have taken place does not justify an assumption that it did take place.
316. Indicative of the chilling effect of the Court's failure to draw a sharp line between
child pornography and nudity is a report in an Alaskan newspaper that authorities at East High
School in Anchorage, citing the Osborne ruling, forbade students to publish in their 1990 yearbook
naked pictures of the students as babies. Alaska Ear, Anchorage Daily News, Apr. 22, 1990,
at B3, col. 1. In 1991, the U.S. attorney in San Francisco sought indictment of a photographer
based, at least in part, on photographs he took of young girls at nude beaches. According to
prosecuting officials, the photographs focused on the genitals, and thereby fit the Osborne
definition of child pornography. Panel Rejects Pornography Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1991,
at A29, col. 1. The grand jury, however, declined to indict. Id.
317. Cf. Schauer, supra note 222, at 300 (stating that although Ferber mentioned the
proposition that speech may be regulated when it is an important part of an unlawful act, the
correct approach analyzes the value of the speech's content rather than its connection with
illegal activity).
318. State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 50, 503 N.E.2d 697, 703-04 (1986) (holding that
statute criminalizing private possession of materials depicting minors engaging in sexual activity,
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States Supreme Court exempted child pornography from First Amendment protection on the theory that the state has a right to prevent
"sexual exploitation and abuse of children."319 The Court said that
"[s]exual molestation by adults is often involved in the production of
' '32
child sexual performances. 0
The rationale for allowing a child pornography prohibition is that
a child is unable to consent to the sexual conduct involved in the
pornography.221 If the child is over the age of consent for sexual conduct, the sexual conduct is deemed to be lawful. Thus, a valid prohibition against the use of children in child pornography would have to
incorporate an age requirement no lower than the age for lawful consent to sexual conduct.
States typically define the term "minor" for their child pornography
statutes as "one under the age of eighteen." 32 The age of consent for
sexual conduct, however, is typically fifteen or sixteen.3 Thus, where
the child is sixteen or seventeen, the sexual activity may be considered
lawful. At this age, the child is deemed capable of consenting to the
sexual conduct depicted in the child pornography.
In the New York statute at issue in Ferber, the sexual conduct
depicted was unlawful because the statute regulated depictions of sexual conduct by children under the age of sixteen.3- The age of consent
for sexual conduct in New York was seventeen.2 Under the Ohio

masturbation, or bestiality did not violate the First Amendment since the statute advanced
"compelling" state interests of preserving minors' privacy and protecting them from many forms
of abuse attendant with child pornography), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 936 (1987).
319. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
320. Id. at 758 n.9 (citation omitted).
321. People v. Spargo, 103 [11.App. 3d 280, 286, 431 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982)
(reviewing defendant's conviction for exhibiting to an undercover police investigator a photo
album containing seventy color photographs of young, nude boys masturbating or exhibiting
their genitals); COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, su pra note 46, at 412.
322. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 11-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) ("A minor is
a person who has not attained the age of 18 years. A person who has attained the age of 18
years is of legal age for all purposes .. ").
323. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (Supp. 1990) (making sexual intercourse, lewd
fondling, and solicitation to engage in lewd fondling a crime when "any of the . . . acts [are
engaged in] with a child who is under 16 years of age .. ").
324. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (Consol. 1989) ("A person is guilty of promoting a
sexual performance by a child when . . . he produces, directs or promotes any performance
which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 5, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (No. 81-55) (stating that one depiction
was a film containing scenes of naked boys, "some no older than seven or eight years of age,
. engaged in solo and mutual masturbation").
325. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25.
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statute at issue in Osborne, no age was specified, but the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that the relevant age was eighteen.3 26 However, in Ohio,
the age of consent for sexual conduct was fifteen.32 Thus, with a child
that was fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen years of age, the sexual conduct
was considered lawful, but production, distribution, or possession of
a depiction of that conduct was considered unlawful.
This age discrepancy undercuts the rationale in favor of regulating
child pornography. The rationale for prohibiting the possession of child
pornography is that it facilitates an injury to the child depicted. 3 ? But
if the child is engaging in conduct that she or he is deemed capable
of undertaking consensually, then the child has incurred no injury.

XIII.

PROOF OF AGE OF THE CHILD DEPICTED

Osborne also had challenged the method which Ohio used to establish the age of the persons depicted in the four photographs at issue.29
The United States Supreme Court, however, did not accept this issue
for review.3 0 At Osborne's trial, the prosecution introduced the four
photographs into evidence and asked the jury to decide that the person
depicted in the pictures was younger than eighteen years of age.3 1
One of the photographs had an inscription on the reverse side: "Tommy
13.''32 The prosecution suggested that the inscription indicated that
the person depicted in the photograph was thirteen years of age.M
The prosecution, however, had no evidence establishing who had written the inscription, or whether the number referred to the age of the
child or to something else.3
In the typical child pornography case, the prosecution has a photograph that depicts a person. The prosecution asserts that the person
is below the statutory age. The photograph is then introduced into
evidence and the trier of fact is asked to conclude that the person
depicted in the photograph is below the relevant statutory age. On
occasion, pediatricians have testified as expert witnesses to estimate
the age of the child in the photograph. Courts have never required

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
County
332.

Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 525 N.E.2d at 1368.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Anderson Supp. 1990).
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at 16-18, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
Docket Sheet, Osborne (No. 88-5986).
Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 52-55, State v. Osborne, No. 14333 (Franklin
Mun. Court, Sept. 24, 1985).
Id. at 53.

333. Id.
334. Id.
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that the photographer testify to authenticate the photograph. Bowing
to the difficulty of prosecution if strict proof requirements were imposed, the courts have allowed the trier of fact to determine the age
of the person depicted by simply viewing the photograph.
This method of establishing the age of the person depicted in a
photograph is questionable. Typically, when photographs are used as
evidence in criminal cases, the prosecution must authenticate the
photograph to prove that the photograph is a true representation of
what the photograph appears to depict.- If the prosecution alleges
that the person depicted is below a given age, the prosecution should
be required to either present proof of the identity and age of the
person depicted of', at least, present expert testimony on the depicted
person's age.
Beyond the question of age, there are other problems of authentication. Photographs may be produced by splicing material together.
A photograph that appears to be of a person may in fact be of a
dummy, or a wax figure. If the photograph is of poor quality, it may
not be obvious that the photograph depicts a live person.
One consequence to the rationale that children are harmed by posing in pornographic photographs is that the depiction in the photograph
must be of a real child. 3 6 Thus, if the depiction is of a dummy or is
an artist's representation, there would be no child pornography.When the state introduces a photograph that appears to be of a person,

335. See, e.g., United States v. Stratton, 392 F. Supp. 552, 554 (E.D. Pa.) (A photograph
that is admitted into evidence must be authenticated.), affd, 523 F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1976).
336. CoMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 46, at 597. See also Kent & Truesdell,
supra note 40, at 370 n.29 (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2252, the federal child pornography statute,
includes as child pornography only the depiction of real children and would therefore not cover
an artist's sketch that was not of an actual child). Because child pornography regulation is aimed
at protecting children within the state, it is not obvious that a state may regulate depictions
of even a real child if the depiction is produced outside the state. The Supreme Court in Ferber
said that a state may prohibit the distribution of materials produced outside the state. Ferber,
458 U.S. at 766-67. The Court noted that it is "often impossible to determine where such material
is produced," and that it is often produced abroad. Id. at 767 n.19. In oral argument in Osborne,
Justice Marshall asked whether the material in question had been produced in Ohio. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 45, Osborne (No. 88-5986). But the Court's opinion in Osborne did not
address the issue, even though the evidence was that the photographs were mailed from Florida.
Id.
337. State statutes would seem to be limited to depictions of real children by their use of
the term "minor," which means a real person below a specified age. See statutes cited supra
note 41. Material conveyed by computer would not be child pornography for this reason.
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393

that is not sufficient proof that the photograph is, in fact, of a real
person. Again, expert testimony should be required to establish that
fact . w
XIV.

THE POSING OF A CHILD AS AN ELEMENT OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

The New York statute at issue in Ferber prohibited "performances."' 19 This implied that the photographing had to be staged or
posed. 30 To justify the New York statute, the Supreme Court determined that a substantial portion of the harm to a child is the psychological and possibly physical harm from being staged in sexual conduct.341
The post-Ferber statutes, however, were not limited to posed depictions.3 2 These statutes simply referred to depictions of a child engaged
in sexual conduct. 4 3 The Ohio statute, as construed by the Ohio Supreme Court, did not require the prohibited depictions to have been
posed' 4 or, indeed, to show sexual conduct. 5
Although the United States Supreme Court in Osborne did not
mention this aspect of the Ohio statute, Justice Brennan, in his dissent,
noted that under the statute
there is no requirement that the State show .
that the
child . . . knew that a photograph was taken. I do not see
how a candid shot taken without the minor's knowledge can
'haun[t]' him or her in the years to come ... when there6 is
no indication that the child is even aware of its existence.3

338. There also should be a temporal limitation on child pornography. If the depiction is
of a child that lived centuries ago, the harm to that child would not be sufficient to warrant
regulation.
339. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (Consol. 1989). A "sexual performance" is defined as "any
performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years
of age." Id. § 263.00(1).
340. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 750-51.
341. Id. at 758.
342. The post-Ferber statutes are cited supra note 41.
343. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.247 (West 1987) ("A person who has in possession
a photographic representation of sexual conduct which involves a minor, knowing or with reason
to know its content and character and that an actual minor is an actor or photographic subject
in it, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.") (emphasis added).
344. Young, 37 Ohio St. 3d at 252, 525 N.E.2d at 1368 (citing to OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.323(A)(3)).
345. See supra text accompanying notes 271-76, 289-300.
346. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1714 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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By not acknowledging this problem, the United States Supreme
Court in Osborne upheld a statute that covered candid photographs.
If a person takes a candid photograph of a child emerging from a lake
after skinny-dipping, that photograph might be illegal if the trier of
fact decides that the genitals are in "graphic focus. '' -7 The fact that
the child might have been unaware that the photograph was taken is
of no relevance. Although a candid photograph may, depending on the
context, invade the child's privacy, the candid photograph does not
involve the psychological trauma that the Ferber Court found as a
compelling justification for a state to warrant a criminal prohibition.
XV.

STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE STATE'S

ASSERTED INTEREST

The Supreme Court in Ferber and Osborne did not articulate
whether the means by which a state regulates child pornography must
be "compelling" or need only bear a rational relationship to preventing
child pornography. In Ferber, the Court found the state's interest in
protecting children from the sexual exploitation associated with being
posed for nude photographs to be compelling.-8 The Ferber Court
gave two reasons for the conclusion that prohibiting the commercial
distribution of child pornography is an appropriate means to eliminate
production of child pornography:
First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the
children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network
for child pornography must be closed if the production of
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children
is to be effectively controlled.-'
In discussing the state's interest in regulating child pornography, however, the Court did not delineate the standard which the state's interest must meet. One commentator concluded that the Court was

347. See supra text accompanying notes 305-13.
348. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756--57. "[A] State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling' . . . [and t]he prevention of sexual exploitation
and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance." Id. at 757.
Cf. Schauer, supra note 222, at 304-06 (asserting that because the Ferber Court considered
child pornography to be on the fringe of First Amendment speech, the courts' "references to
'compelling' and 'surpassing' interests seem more rhetorical than doctrinal").
349. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 (citations omitted).
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requiring only a rational relationship between the ban on commercial
distribution and the elimination of child pornography production. °
In Osborne, the Court cited language from Ferberwhich supported
the assertion that Ohio's interest in protecting the wellbeing of children
was "compelling. '' 1 But, as in Ferber, the Court did not use that
term in discussing the appropriateness of the means chosen to regulate
child pornography. 5 2 The Osborne Court stated that it was "surely
reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production
of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the
product, thereby decreasing demand."' ' The Court's use of "reasonable" suggested that the Court was requiring only a rational relationship between the interest Ohio sought to protect and the means Ohio
employed to protect that interest.
In other cases involving speech and privacy interests, the Court
has held that the state must establish a "compelling" interest with
respect to both the harm the state seeks to prevent, and the means
used to prevent that harm. In Roe v. Wade,3 for example, because
the privacy right was involved the Court found: 'Where certain 'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest."'
Even where a state has a "compelling" interest to prevent a given
harm, the state must protect that interest through means that do not
unnecessarily infringe upon basic fundamental rights. In Shelton v.
Tucker,s7 Arkansas required all public school teachers to file annual

350. See Potuto, supra note 40, at 49.
351. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696. The language cited, in part, was:
It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a state's interest in "safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor" is "compelling." . . . The
legislative judgment, as well as the judgment found in relevant literature, is that
the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child. That judgment, we think, easily
passes muster under the First Amendment.
Id. (quoting Ferber,458 U.S. at 756-58).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 348-50.
353. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
354. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See Potuto, supra note 40, at 50.
355. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
356. Id. at 155.
357. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shelton, Arkansas sought to compel every public school teacher,
as a condition of employment, to annually file an affidavit listing every organization to which
they have belonged or contributed within the preceding five years. Id. at 480. The Supreme
Court recognized Arkansas' legitimate interest in using such information to inquire into teachers'
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affidavits listing every organization to which they belonged.
The
Supreme Court acknowledged that Arkansas had a valid interest in
checking the fitness of state teachers. 359 However, the Court determined that the teachers had a First Amendment right to association,36
and "even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved.361 The Court thus found the means used by the state to
assure teachers' fitness was invalid because it was not narrowly tai62
lored to serve the state's interest.3
Similarly in Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3
the Court found that the means used to achieve an admittedly legitimate interest were far too sweeping to pass muster under the First
Amendment.364 In Schaumberg, an Illinois village concerned about
groups fraudulently soliciting funds for charitable purposes prohibited
charities from soliciting on a door-to-door basis if the groups did not
use at least seventy-five percent of their receipts for charitable purposes.3 - "The Village's legitimate interest in preventing fraud can be

fitness to teach. Id. at 485. However, due to the "unlimited" scope of the information request,
the Court held that the requirement was an unconstitutional interference with the teachers'
right of free association. Id. at 4S9-90.
358. Id. at 480. The Arkansas statute provided, in pertinent part, that
No person shall be employed . . . as a . . .teacher in any public school . . . until
such person shall have submitted to the appropriate hiring authority an affidavit
listing all organizations to which he at the time belongs and to which he has
belonged during the past five years, and also listing all organizations to which he
at the time is paying regular dues or is making regular contributions ...
Id. at 480-81.
359. Id. at 485.
360. Id. at 490.
361. Id. at 488. The Shelton Court explained why the Arkansas requirement was too broad:
The statute does not provide that the information it requires be kept confidential.
Each school board is left free to deal with the information as it wishes. . . . Even
if there were no disclosure to the general public, the pressure upon a teacher to
avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny
would be constant and heavy.

Id.
362. Id. at 490.
363. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
364. Id. at 636-37.
365. Id. at 624. The Village of Schaumburg adopted an ordinance requiring charitable
organizations to apply for a permit as a prerequisite to solicitations door-to-door or on the public
streets. Id. at 623. An organization which solicited without a permit was subject to a fine for
each offense in an amount up to $500. Id. at 624. The ordinance required that permit applications,
among other information, contain "[s]atisfactory proof that at least seventy-five per cent
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better served by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on
"the ordinance cannot survive
solicitation." 36 The Court thus held that367
scrutiny under the First Amendment.

In Texas v. Johnson,36 a case in which Texas prosecuted a man
for burning an American flag, the Court conceded that Texas had "an
interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag. ' 369 Nevertheless,
the Court held that Texas may not "criminally punish a person for
burning a flag as a means of political protest."3 70 The state's legitimate
interest did not justify the state's means, which infringed upon First
Amendment rights.3 71 In Johnson, the Court determined that means

used to achieve the state's interest must be subject to "the most
exacting scrutiny" when they infringe upon First Amendment rights.372
In Osborne, Ohio had a compelling interest to protect children from
the harms associated with being posed for photographs while engaging
in sexual conduct. 3 7 Such an interest, however, did not permit Ohio
to override other persons' constitutional protections without compel-

of the proceeds of such solicitations will be used directly for the charitable purpose of the
organization." Id. (quoting SCHAUMBURG, ILL. CODE § 22-20(g) (1975)). An organization seeking
a charitable solicitation permit could comply with the ordinance's "satisfactory proof" requirement
only by submitting "a certified audit of the [organization's] last full year of operations." Id. at
624 n.4 (quoting SCHAUMBERG, ILL. CODE § 22-20). The ordinance mandated the audit indicate
the organization's distribution of funds or other comparable information. Id.
366. Id. at 637.
367. Id. at 636. The Schaumburg Court also found the ordinance's "seventy-five per cent"
presumption inconsistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 637. The ordinance presumed that
"any organization using more than twenty-five percent of its receipts on fundraising, salaries,
and overhead is not a charitable . . . enterprise and that to permit it to represent itself as a
charity is fraudulent." Id. at 636. The Court recognized, however, that this could not be "true
of those organizations that are primarily engaged in research, advocacy, or public education and
that use their own paid staff to carry out these functions. . . ." Id. Because the Schaumberg
ordinance lumped these types of legitimate charitable organizations together with those organizations which used 'the charitable label as a cloak," the ordinance unnecessarily interfered with
legitimate organizations' First Amendment rights. Id. at 637.
368. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
369. Id. at 418. The Court gave an example of a valid regulation pertaining to treatment
of the flag: "Congress has, for example, enacted precatory regulations describing the proper
treatment of the flag." Id. (citing 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-177 (1988)). The Johnson Court, however,
contrasted the propriety of regulating proper treatment of the flag and criminalizing its destruction: ' To say that the Government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag,
however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning a flag as a means of
political protest." Id.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. Id. at 411 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
373. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
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ling reasons.374 Ohio's reasons were not compelling enough to justify
a complete prohibition on the private possession of child pornog3 75
raphy.
XVI.

SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE OVERBREADTH

The Osborne Court concluded that the Ohio statute would be constitutionally valid even if overbroad so long as the statute was not
"substantially overbroad. '3 76 This meant that the statute could stand
even if the Ohio Supreme Court's formulations of "lewd exhibition"
and "graphic focus on the genitals," and the statute's prohibition
against "viewing," invaded the realm of constitutionally protected
speech activity.3 77 In determining that the statute would be constitutional even if overbroad,3 7 the Supreme Court referred to the "substantial overbreadth" test formulated in Broadrick v. Oklahoma.3 79 In
Broadrick, the Court held that where the regulated activity involves
conduct in addition to speech, the overbreadth of the statute must be
"substantial" before the statute is invalid.3 0 The statute at issue in

374. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (stating that the state's interest in preventing
child sexual abuse did not override the defendant's right to confront witnesses).
375. The Court's lack of concern about establishing facts was similar to that of the Attorney
General's Commission, on which the Court relied. See supra note 116. The Commission conducted
no independent factual research yet made sweeping factual conclusions about the harmful impact
of child pornography. See id. One analyst characterized the Commission's approach by saying that
[it] so weakens the burden of justification required for the abridgement of pornographic material that no serious level of scrutiny is accorded the arguments offered
to justify such censorship. Indeed, the very kinds of arguments offered by the
Commission as adequate justification for censorship are, on examination, the kinds
of arguments that classical principles of free speech condemn as an inadequate
basis for law.
Richards, supra note 116, at 277.
376. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
377. Id. The Osbornie Court recalled its previous finding in Ferber that "[eiven where a
statute at its margins infringes on protected expression, 'facial invalidation is inappropriate if
the remainder of the statute... covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally
proscribable . . . conduct .

Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770 n.25).

378. Id.
379. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
380. Id. at 615. The Court did not limit applicability of the "substantial" overbreadth analysis
to speech associated with conduct only. The Broadrick Court, however, did determine that
speech regulations must be substantially overbroad "particularlywhere conduct and not merely
speech is involved." Id. As a result of the Broadrick Court's injection of "substantiality" into
overbreadth analysis, the Court moved to a case-by-case determination of overbreadth, rather
than applying a facial overbreadth determination. See id. at 615-16. For a comparison of the
case-by-case approach effected by Broadrick's "substantial overbreadth" holding and the Court's
previous overbreadth doctrine, see Note, The FirstAmendment Overbreadth Doctrine,83 HARV.
L. REV. 844 (1970).
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Broadrick regulated government employees' political campaigning.38
The "conduct" at issue was political activity of state employees.8 The
Court's rationale for requiring "substantial" overbreadth was that the
"conduct" aspect gave the state greater latitude in regulating.3 The
Broadrick Court noted that the facial overbreadth adjudication
attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure speech" toward
conduct and that conduct - even if expressive - falls within
the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls
over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct ...
To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct
and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep.
In Ferber, the Supreme Court used the Broadrick "substantial
overbreadth" test.8 The Ferber Court acknowledged that the Broadrick Court had not considered whether the substantiality requirement
applied to "pure speech" situations.3 Nevertheless, the Court applied
the substantiality requirement to the Ferber case because the facts
involved "the harmful employment of children to make sexually explicit
materials for distribution."' The "conduct" at issue in the Ferbercase
was the distributor using children for the production of child pornography. The Osborne Court, however, ruled that Ferber had "specifically held" that the substantiality requirement was applicable to "pure
speech." That characterization seems at odds with the language in
Ferber.

381.
382.
383.

Id. at 604-06.
Id.
Id. at 615.

384. Id.
385. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773. The Ferber Court held that the New York statute at issue
was not "substantially overbroad." Id. Instead, the Court found the statute to be "the paradigmatic case of a state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications." Id.
386. Id. at 771.
387. Id.
388. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 n.12 (1985); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1026 (1988) (stating that the Ferber Court found "pure

speech" but nonetheless required substantial overbreadth).
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With an offense involving possession only, as in Osborne, pure
speech is involved. The only arguable conduct is the possession itself.
Nevertheless, the Osborne Court applied the "substantial" overbreadth
test. 9 Citing Broadrick, the Court in Osborne stated that
in our previous decisions discussing the First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine, we have repeatedly emphasized that
where a statute regulated expressive conduct, the scope of
the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its
overbreadth is not only "real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. ''3
The Osborne Court, however, omitted the rest of that sentence from
Broadrick which included "particularly where conduct and not merely
3' 9
speech is involved. '
Therefore, Osborne marks the first time the Supreme Court applied
the "substantiality" requirement where the speech activity was "pure
speech" rather than "mixed speech-conduct." This is an unfortunate
innovation in overbreadth analysis because the "substantiality" criterion provides a ready rationale for refusing to strike statutes that
invade the freedom of speech.
In Ferber,the Court held that a "substantiality" requirement was
implicit in the overbreadth doctrine.39 2 "The requirement of substantial
overbreadth," the Court reasoned
is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of
expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with
the declining reach of the regulation. 393
On the contrary, a substantiality requirement seems to be inconsistent with the overbreadth doctrine. In Broadrick, the Supreme
Court explained the rationale behind the overbreadth doctrine: "the
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.
Id.
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others may be muted and perceived grievances left to fester because
of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes."' 4
If a statute regulates both unprotected and protected speech, an
overbreadth analysis should not depend upon whether the scope of
the protected speech covered by the statute is limited. As the Court
noted in Ferber,the "extent of deterrence of protected speech can be
' ' 95
expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation. 3
However, even where the scope of the protected speech is slight, a
statute would nonetheless remain enforceable despite the fact that the
statute outlaws protected speech. The purpose of the overbreadth
doctrine is to preclude the continued existence of such statutes.3 96 The
substantiality requirement is dangerous to the protection of speech
even where "conduct," in addition to speech, is involved as in Broad39 However,
rick and Ferber.
the substantiality requirement is all the
more dangerous when applied to pure speech as was the case in Os398
borne.
XVII.

THE IMPACT OF THE OSBORNE DECISION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Osborne places
the United States well below the level of privacy protection accepted
at the international level .s European countries typically prohibit the
commercial distribution of obscene publications without distinguishing
whether the materials contain obscenity or child pornography as the
United States Supreme Court has. 40° The European Commission of
394. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
395. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772.
396. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612; supra text accompanying note 394.
397. See Ferber,458 U.S. at 771; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 604-06.
398. See Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
399. See generally Beytagh, Privacy in Perspective: The Experience Under Foreign Constitutions, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1984) (exploring other countries' privacy rights by review
of foreign constitutional provisions expressly protecting the right of privacy, foreign case law
applying a privacy right in various contexts, and foreign legislation seeking to protect privacy).
400. CRIMINAL CODE art. 228 (U.S.S.R.) (prohibiting possession for sale or distribution,
of pornographic materials); PENAL CODE art. 528, Royal Decree No. 1398 (It.) (prohibiting
possession for purposes of commerce or distribution of obscene publications); PENAL CODE art.
283 (Fr.) (prohibiting possession for commerce, distribution, or display of publications contrary
to good morals); PENAL CODE art. 288 (Hung.) (prohibiting acquisition of obscene object for
purpose of circulating or exhibiting in public); PENAL CODE art. 184 (Ger.) (prohibiting dissemination of "obscene writings, depictions, or pictures"); Belgium, Penal Code (1867), art. 383
(prohibiting sale or distribution of publications contrary to good morals); Obscene Publications
Act, 1964, ch. 74, § 1 (Eng.) (prohibiting possession of obscene articles for publication with
gain); Protection of Children Act, 1978, ch. 37, § 1 (Eng.) (prohibiting possession "with a view
to their being distributed or shown by himself or others" of indecent photographs of a child
under the age of sixteen).
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Human Rights has upheld such prohibitions against challenges brought
under the freedom of expression provision in the European Convention
0
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.4 1
While some European penal codes do prohibit possession of child pornography for distribution, they do not prohibit the possession of such
4°
materials for personal use in the home or elsewhere. As stated, the European countries distinguish between possession
for distribution and possession for personal use. 403 This represents a
policy judgment that possession for personal use need not be prohibited
as part of the effort to curb such publications. The policy decision also
represents placement of a higher value on personal freedom.4°,
In Ferber, the Supreme Court authorized the regulation of the
child pornography industry. States then were permitted to outlaw the
commercial production and distribution of a new category of material,
beyond obscenity, which was referred to as child pornography. 4°5 In
Osborne, the Supreme Court went a step farther and authorized the
regulation of the private possession of child pornography. 4° Additionally, the Osborne Court significantly expanded the definition of child
pornography by overlooking criteria the Ferber Court found essential
as a predicate to regulation. Specifically, the Court: (1) diluted the
Ferber requirement that sexual conduct be depicted407 thus blurring
the line between child pornography and depictions of nudity;4° (2)

401. E.g., X., Y. & Z. v. Belgium, 9 Euro. Comm'n H.R. 13 (1978) (upholding article 383
of the Belgian Penal Code and construing article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10).
402. See statutes cited supra note 400.
403. Id.
404. The stricter protection of personal privacy in Europe is reflected in the general absence
of sodomy statutes in Europe and in the holding of the European Court of Human Rights that
sodomy statutes violate the right of privacy under article 8 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Norris Case, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21
(1988) (finding sodomy statute of Republic of Ireland violative of right of privacy under European
Convention); Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981) (finding sodomy statute of
Northern Ireland violative of right of privacy under European Convention). See also Michael,
Homosexuals and Privacy, 138 NEw L.J. 831 (1988) (comparing European Court of Human
Rights' decision in Case of Norris, which held that statutes criminalizing sodomy violated the
right to privacy, with the United States Supreme Court's decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, which
came to an opposite conclusion). In comparison, half the states in the United States prohibit
sodomy, and the Supreme Court has upheld these prohibitions against a privacy challenge. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
405. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
406. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
407. See su pra text accompanying notes 277-307.
408. See supra text accompanying notes 308-16.
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403

dropped the Ferberrequirement that the sexual conduct depicted be
illegal;409 (3) ignored the Ferber requirement that the depiction be
posed, upholding the Ohio statute even though it covered candid photographs; 410 and (4) upheld the Ohio statute although it outlawed "viewing.,,411

In effecting these significant inroads on speech and privacy protection, the Court did not explain the standards used to assess the Ohio
regulations. However, the Court apparently ignored the requirement
used in other privacy cases which required the state to establish a
in both the harm and the means used to avert
compelling interest
2
41
that harm.

The Court accepted without discussion Ohio's sweeping factual
claims about the harm that allegedly flows from the private possession
of child pornography. The Court provided little reasoning to substantiate these conclusions about the harmful consequences of the private
possession of child pornography. The Court left itself open to the
biting critique of the three dissenters, who pointed out the absence
of any basis in the Court's opinion for a finding that a ban on the
4
possession of child pornography was warranted. 13

The scope of the Court's exception from First and Fourth Amendment protection may be difficult to confine. Although states have an
interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation, that does not
give the states the right to undermine First and Fourth Amendment
values. This is particularly true with the prohibition against the private
possession of child pornography, where the infringement is not likely
to serve the state's interest to any appreciable extent. Hopefully the
Court in future speech and privacy cases Will limit the exception to
child pornography. However, one can imagine claims that the private
possession of other types of publications should be outlawed on a
similar rationale of the social harm associated with the possession.
For example, it is arguable that a state can decide to prohibit the
private possession of a book on the use of firearms on the theory that
the reader might use the book to learn about guns and commit a
crime. One could argue, citing Osborne, that such a prohibition is a
necessary component of a state's efforts to prohibit the use of guns
in the commission of crime. However, the infringement on speech and
privacy rights would be substantial.

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

See supra text accompanying notes 317-28.
See supra text accompanying notes 340-47.
See supra text accompanying notes 255-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 354-72.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1714-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The Stanley principle that the government may not dictate what
printed or visual materials persons may possess in the home 414 is logically applicable to all material that is possessed for its communicative
value. The right to possess any kind of communicative material is a
basic right of the individual. This is true regardless of the material's
content. If the government can dictate what communicative material
people may or may not possess, the danger to liberty is substantial.
The right to receive information should not be curtailed because the
government finds the information to be of little social value.415
The teaching of the United States Supreme Court cases on the
First Amendment is that speech material is in need of special protection. This rationale applies not only to vindicate a given person who
might be prosecuted for speech activity, but also, and more importantly, so that others will not censor themselves for fear of prosecution.
The power of government to peruse books or photograph albums in
an individual's home, as Ohio police did in Osborne's home, is an
ominous power. In Osborne, the Supreme Court declared for the first
time that a person's library is not sacrosanct, but is subject to police
inspection. This power is inconsistent with a spirit of free inquiry.

414.
415.

See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969); supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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